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This thesis has two basic research objectives. First
to examine the political development of Morocco and to
prove, despite an outward appearance of political tension,
that the nation is politically stable and progressing
politically at a pace which will ensure representational
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political development are used to predict the future
course of Moroccan politics.
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aid to Morocco during the last twenty years. A correlation
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I. INTRODUCTION
All modernizing societies are in a process of transition,
We know where these nations have been, however, the future
course of political development can only be hypothesized.
It is in the interest of the United States (in order to
chart our own political course in regard to these developing
nations) to have some insight into the probable destination
of these countries.
Morocco achieved its independence from France in 1956
and we have since witnessed numerous news reports reporting
on the political instability of the nation. The feeling
held by most political scientists is that the nation is on
the verge of political upheaval and King Hassan II is on
borrowed time for not fulfilling the political expectations
of the populace.
In the year of independence, King Mohammed V nominated
a consultative assembly to assist in governing the nation
which was followed two years later by an invitation co the
major political (The Istiqlal) to form a government.
However, the numerous restrictions placed on the party
resulted in the Istiqlal Party splitting into conservative
and left wing factions with the left wing faction, the Union
Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) becoming the main
opposition to the monarchy. The party grew in popular
support and in i960 the UNFP won the majority of seats in

Morocco's first municipal elections since independence.
Dissatisfied with the political trend, Mohammed V placed
himself at the head of the government and his son Hassan as
Prime Minister.
The unexpected death of Mohammed V in 1961 brought
Hassan to the throne. Hassan's education and past involve-
ment in Moroccan political affairs proved to be valuable
assets. Hassan obtained his formal education primarily at
European institutions and obtained his law degree from the
University of Bordeaux. He was actively involved with the
nationalists in their drive for independence and once achieved
was made Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. He acted as
confidant to the King in political matters and frequently
represented the state on overseas diplomatic missions. In
I960, when King Mohammed V assumed the Premiership and
control of the government he appointed the Crown Prince as
Vice-Premier. King Hassan II fostered the growth of the
right wing trend. The growth of the new party resulted in
a stalemate in the 1963 elections between the left wing and
the right wing factions. The FDIC garnished the most votes,
however, they lost seven ministerial positions. The Istiqlal
and the UNFP had a combined total of thirty seven percent
of the vote with the remaining thirty nine percent of the
voters representing non partisan candidates.. Before any
Gallagher, C. P., "The Meanings of Moroccan Elections,"
AUFS North Africa Series, v. 9, June 1963, p. 6.

political movement could get started, Morocco became
embroiled in a border war with Algeria which temporarily
brought all political parties together in a show of national
unity. However, once the war ended and although Morocco was
victorious, we again witness a host of political problems as
riots involving students and workers erupted. The government
quelled the riots and attempted to set up a coalition
government, but the UNFP refused to cooperate. The King
declared a state of emergency in 1965 and the National
Assembly was inaugurated. In July 1971 King Hassan II
narrowly escaped a coup attempt initiated by army officers.
In March 1972 another national referendum approved the third
new constitution since Hassan assumed the throne and in
August of the same year there was another coup attempt by
members of the Air Force. It was after this second coup
attempt that the new constitution was temporarily suspended.
In 1973, armed bands fought government troops in the Atlas
regions of Morocco. The government alleged that the subver-
sive elements were financed by Libya and that the Rabat
branch of the UNFP was being used as a cover for these
subversive activities. The government made hundreds of
arrests charging them with endangering the security of the
state. Included in those arrested were three members of the
Central Committee and the Administrative Commission. These
arrests led to the conviction of many of the UNFP
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organizers. This was followed in 1974 by the suspension of
all political organizations and an atmosphere of a police
state. With political turmoil brewing beneath the surface,
the King again rallied the nation together over the Spanish
Sahara issue. The eventual cession of Spanish Sahara to
Morocco and Mauritania resulted in a great political victory
for King Hassan II. The King has ridden the crest of this
political victory until the present time, however, the
opposition parties are still advocating that he relinquish
some of his power. Problems of population growth, agriculture
setbacks and jobs for college graduates continue to plague
Morocco creating further problems for King Hassan II. In
1977 the political parties, trade unions and student groups
still appear to be a source of trouble and instability for
the Moroccan monarchy.
Looking at this brief scenario of Moroccan political
events since independence which includes three different
constitutions, the assumption of direct rule by both monarchs,
two coup attempts by the military, subversive activities by
a major political party and student and worker riots would
tend to support the aforementioned opinions concerning the
instability of the nation.
2Africa Research Bulletin , "Anti Government Activities,"
March 1-31, 1973, p. 2793-2794; "Action Against UNFP," April




It is j however, the contention of this author that the
nature of the Moroccan political scene is basically sound
in light of the fact that the nation is a modernizing
autocracy in a process of transition. According to David
Apter these systems can normally tolerate wide changes in
social and economic life and adapt quickly to the establish-
ment and employment of a bureaucracy. However, they cannot
easily cope with new social and political groups which demand
a change in the political system and principles of legitimacy.
It is also submitted that much political behavior in Morocc
frequently interpreted as being a manifestation of political
instability can more appropriately be identified as charac-
teristic Moroccan behavior formulated by its unique culture.
This paper will examine the role of traditionalism in
Morocco with specific emphasis on the Arab-Berber makeup of
Moroccan society and their cultural, linguistic and
political differences. The union of two such distinct
cultures into a homogeneous state built on fellow feeling
while eliminating primordial discontent is bound to have
lasting effects. The Berbers, a tribal segmentary society
speaking their own language comprise the majority of the
population. The Berbers political system consisted of a
system of balanced opposition without any central authority.
Apter, D. E., The Political Kingdom in Uganda
,
p. 26,
Princeton University Press, 1961 . For an excellent description
of the characteristics of a modernizing autocracy also see
pages 27 and 28.
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The society consisted of tribes and was designed to prevent
serious political ambition. The elected tribal chiefs could
only govern by consent and all elections must be unanimous.
The Arabs on the other hand tended to live along the coastal
plains and in urban areas under a central administrative
authority. The Arabs spoke Arabic and were politically
aware of the advantages of a central government. The
incongruities of the two societies appear to be too diverse
to allow the formation of a harmonious society. However,
within these two societies existed the common bond of Islam.
This proves to be most important since the role of Islam
within a muslim society will permeate all aspects of society.
The Islamic views on history, predestination, community,
church and state and the nature of authority will color the
muslim' s view on modernization. Traditionalists versus
modernizers has two distinct political poles within Moroccan
politics with the amount of deviation from pure Islamic
doctrine producing different factions all along the political
spectrum.
The establishment of Morocco as a protectorate of France
in 1912 has had the most profound effect on political
modernization. The impact by the French on education,
cultural assimilation, economics and political administration
have left deep imprints on Morocco which will not easily be
removed. The direct clash between a modern, western and
industrialized nation with a traditional, Muslim and tribal
culture was bound to produce a violent reaction. The French
12

during the protectorate fostered the creation of an elite
class in Moroccan society through their system of education.
The creation of a new class of Moroccans, the evolue, was
French educated and desired to be assimilated into French
culture. What actually resulted was the refusal by the
French to accept them while in the process the evolue lost
his cultural contact with the rest of Moroccan society. It
will be to these new elites that the responsibility of
political modernization will fall. The study of elites must
go deeper to include all Moroccan elites, their orientations
and groups or factions that could be potential problem areas.
These elites were the original founders of Moroccan political
parties and were the driving force in the growth ofMoroccan
nationalism in their quest for total independence from France
I will review the growth of political parties in Morocco to
examine the relationship between the parties and the monarchy
The policy of segmental opposition in tribal Morocco can
be seen today within the political structure. The monarchy
has successfully prevented any one political party from
obtaining a majority of political power. It is in this
fashion that the monarchy is able to play one political
party against the other as it orchestrates Moroccan politics.
The last chapter prior to the conclusion will trace the
path of U. S . -Moroccan relations. The strategic importance
of Morocco due to its geographic location has resulted in
superpower interest in the country. A correlation between
U.S. aid and Moroccan voting patterns in the United Nations
13

will be made to assess United States influence in Moroccan
affairs
.
To establish an historical perspective, the initial
Arab conquests of the area will be examined and the resulting
Arab-Berber conflicts will be discussed. The period of the
French Protectorate will be looked at to view French
successes and failures in controlling Moroccan society and
the French impact on political modernization. The growth
of Moroccan nationalism follows with the formation of
Moroccan political parties. With this background an attempt
will be made to chart Moroccan-United States relations since






The path of Morocco as a modernizing autocracy has been
conditioned and continues to be determined in great part to
the influence of historical development and traditionalism.
This paper will commence with a general overview of
Moroccan history beginning with the initial Arab influx
into the northwest corner of Africa.
The Arab armies started their infiltration into the
Maghrib, the present day Arab speaking North African countries
4
of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and parts of Libya, following
their conquest of Egypt about the year 642. This force led
by Amr b al-As wanted to gain military prestige while
releasing the growing pressures from his troops for the
spoils of war. For years the Arab armies raided into the
Maghrib without achieving any lasting footholds. By 667
these armies had advanced as far as Tunisia without estab-
lishing any permanent footholds. The Arab armies were
receiving much opposition from the powerful Berber tribes
who were being aided by the Byzantines. The Berbers were
successful until approximately 700 when the Byzantines were
defeated at Carthage. A strange phenomenon occurred about
now as the former strong resistance shown by the Berbers
virtually disappeared and the Arab armies overran the entire
4 Shimon! , Y. and Levine, E. (eds), Political Dictionary
of the Middle East in the 20th Century
,
p. 244, Quadrangle/
The New York Times Book Company, 1974.
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Maghrib by the end of the year 711. The new conquerors only
required token submission and conversion to Islam from the
Berbers while in return the Arabs solidified the Berber
chieftain's position. There have been several theories as
to the reason for the rapid Berber conversion to Islam.
Probably the most plausible appears to be due to the Berber
recruitment into the Arab armies and the ability to equally
share in the spoils of war as these armies advanced into
Spain. By the year 750 the entire Maghrib was virtually
Islamicized into the Kharajite doctrine.
In addition to Islam, the use of Arabic naturally
followed and became the official language of the portions
of the Maghrib occupied by the Arabs. Many Arab settlers
followed and settled along the coast and on the plains.
It was in these areas that Arabic was predominant although
the linguistic influence was felt throughout the rural
areas. It was during the ninth century that the arabo-
islamic Maghrib took shape and gave birth to an original
type of civilization which still remains alive. Until the
eleventh century the foundation of urban centers was associ-
ated with the intrusion of foreign elements. These centers
appeared in the midst or on the periphery of territory
inhabited by predominantly Berber pastoral tribes. These
5Trimingham, J.S., A History of Islam in West Africa
,
p. 16-25, Oxford University Press, 1962 ; and Barbour, NT (ed),
A Survey of North West Africa
,
p. 15-16, Oxford University
Press, 1962.
c
Hitti, P.K., History of the Arabs
,
p. 246-2^7, Macmillan
and Company, Ltd., 1970.
16

new urban centers survived only to the extent that the tribes
could be prevented from encroachment on them.
Towards the latter part of the tenth century, the Muslims
from Spain advanced into the northern Maghrib and occupied it
through the first decade of the eleventh century. When the
Spanish Muslims departed, tribal rule returned to the
Maghrib. However, government had to go beyond tribalism and
justify itself in terms of upholding the authority of Muslim
law. A political consciousness connected with the belief of
the ultimate unity of all believers had come to exist along
with tribal solidarity.
The Fatamids ruled in the Maghrib through the Berber
Zirid dynasty. With the gradual demise of the Fatamids
after the reign of al-Aziz, the Zirids broke off their
allegiance to the Fatamids which created a void which was
filled by two invasions which lasted almost three hundred
7years. The first was the great Hilali invasion into the
eastern Maghrib and the second that of the Sanhaja Berbers
which occurred almost simultaneously with the first. The
Sanhaja Berbers who had previously inhabited the Sahara
entered the western Maghrib. By 1062, the Almoravids were
firmly established in southern Morocco with their capital at
Marrakesh and within twenty years had conquered all of
Morocco. This state lasted for almost one hundred years
when they were defeated by the Almohad Berbers who lived






in the Atlas mountains and were in control of all of
Morocco by the middle of the twelfth century. This new
empire also lasted about one hundred years and it was
during this period that the Maghrib saw its most brilliant
period. We witness a united Maghrib, a flowering civiliza-
tion with the spread of classical Arabic and great literary
o
tradition. We also see the rise of the Malikite doctrine
and the growth of many Sufi orders. The growth of the Sufi
doctrine can possibly be attributed to the dry intellectualism
of the Almohads . The Almohads were defeated by the Maranid
Berbers in 1275 and political unity was brought to an end.
It was also during this period that political union of
the muslim community was broken and Sufi orders spread
throughout the Maghrib. The Sufi's considered themselves
orthodox muslims.
The Maranid dynasty lasted approximately three centuries
and ended with the Saadian dynasty in Fez towards the middle
of the sixteenth century. However it was during the
Maranid' s reign that Morocco took on its religious character
and its towns took on the aspect which was to last to the
twentieth century. The Maranids were not religious reformers
nor descendants of Mohammed but to compensate for these
obvious drawbacks they served the interests of Islam. During
this dynasty, Morocco became totally Islamized except for a
Hitti, P.K., History of the Arabs, p. 395-398.
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few Jewish communities and totally Arabicized except for
the Berber enclaves in the mountains.
By the fifteenth century the tribal system of government
had exhausted itself and one could see Ibn Khaldun's
cyclical pattern of the rise and fall of states. Ibn
Khaldun explains that royal authority and the foundation
of dynasties are the goal of group feeling. He emphasizes
that sedentary culture is the goal of bedouin life and that
any civilization has a physical life similar to the physical
life of an individual. He uses forty years as being the
end of a growth cycle for an individual at which time there
is a leveling off period followed by a decline and makes
a correlation between man and sedentary civilizations. In
his explanation he shows that when luxury and prosperity
come to civilized people it causes them to follow the ways
of sedentary culture and to adopt its customs. This leads
to diversified luxuries with such things as the elegant
crafts which were not formerly needed. Once this elegance
has reached its limit a subservience to desires undermines
the soul. The civilization can no longer preserve its
religion because it has been firmly affected by customs
that are difficult to discard. We now see that man cannot
afford the luxuries he wants and the expenditures of the
civilization mount so they are no longer reasonable but
become extravagant and the people are dominated by their
customs with all profits going into expenditures. Each
person becomes reduced in circumstances and indigent.
19

Business decreases and the situation of the town decreases.
Because of the many desires and pleasures resulting from
luxury they are found to know everything about the ways and
means of immorality and discuss it openly. This is in
exact opposition to the modesty found in bedouin life.
The civilization is now filled with people of little
character. The younger members of the society have had
their education neglected and the dynasty has failed to
accept them. As the dynasty disintegrates, the civilization
of the city which is the seat of the ruler also suffers and
usually falls into complete ruin very rapidly. Once the
ruling dynasty starts on the road to decay, the rise of the
new dynasty takes place in one of two ways. The first is
for provincial governors to gain control over remote regions
once the ruling dynasty loses its influence in the remote
areas. Here new dynasties flourish and compete amongst
themselves for power with the stronger winning control.
The second way is for a rebel from a neighboring tribe to
revolt against the dynasty. The new leader has a strong
following with group solidarity. They feel that they are
superior to the ruling dynasty which has been affected by
senility. The rebels normally gain domination as they
constantly attack until they have achieved their gaol. Both
of these two methods achieve the goal of domination over the




What we witness through Ibn Khaldun's analysis is a
tribe rallying about its leader to sweep down from the
mountains or desert to rid the country of a degenerate
regime and reestablishing the territorial authority of the
makhzen and then in a matter of two generations deteriorating
into moral decay. We see a circulation of elites through
tribes rotating within a fundamentally stable structure.
The process transforms the socially cohesive tribes into
Q
incohesive sedentary city dwellers.''
Khaldun's premise is that there is a tragic antithesis
between civilization and social cohesion and only tribes
have social cohesion. Thus only tribes can provide the
basis for the political order which cities and civilization
need but do not engender. However, as the tribe provides
this social cohesion the tribe ends up destroying itself.
This pattern of tribal circulation occurred in Morocco until
the twentieth century and the establishment of the French
protectorate. In Saints of the Atlas
,
Gellner points out
that the medieval dynasties which inspired Ibn Khaldun's
analysis were founded by religious movements, whereas the
latter ones sprang from the ranks of religious personnel
10
claiming descent from the Prophet.
q
^Binder, L. , Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of
Middle East Governments, The Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. , v. LI,
no. 3, p. 651-668, Sept. 1957.
Gellner, E., Saints of the Atlas, p. 6.
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European Involvement in Morocco
The tribal system of Morocco also allowed christian
encroachment by both Spain and Portugal. The Portuguese
methodically occupied all major ports on the Atlantic and
deprived Morocco of any maritime involvement. The Portu-
guese occupation incresed the popularity of the Sufi orders
as they start to take on an anti-christian and anti-European
attitude
.
By the sixteenth century we see part of southern Morocco
under the tribe of Banu Sa'd. Banu Sa ' d ' s rise to power was
facilitated by the belief that he was a descendent of the
Prophet. This belief did not withstand the test of time
and was rumoured that he was a descendent of the Prophets
nurse. The important fact, however, is that he was
believed to be a descendent during his climb to fame.
He was able to take the title of Sharif and unite many of
the tribes and start the struggle with the Wattasids and
the Portuguese. By the middle of the sixteenth century
they had put an end to Portuguese domination and had ob-
tained control of Morocco and we witness the start of the
Sharifian empire.
The start of the seventeenth century is filled with
civil strife, political upheaval and economic decline due
to a power struggle between the three sons of al-Mansur.
11Julien, C.A., History of North Africa, p. 222.
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The country is divided and religious leaders as champions
of the oppressed become increasingly more powerful. We
start to see centers of opposition appear throughout the
country. We also witness the uncertainty of political
alliances. The tribes change their political leanings and
put their favor with the Alawites, another Sharifian family
It was in 1666 that Mawlay al-Rashid took the city of Fez
and took the title of Sultan. Prior to this, although
the Alawites took part in the wars with the Portuguese,
they had no defined political status.
The major problem all Moroccan political leaders had
faced was finding a stable base for their authority. The
loyalty of the tribes could be expected only as long as
they were allowed to be a priviledged part of society.
To be able to permanently rely en their support would
necessitate the leader subjugating himself to their demands
In order to keep the country under control and to wage
war against the Christians and Turks, the sharif organized
an army whose loyalty withstood every test, enlisting sold-
12iers levied among the negroes of the Sudan. The most
pressing problem faced by rulers in the western Maghrib
was the recruitment of a reliable military force to insure
their authority. The use of the former black slaves






were established through brutal means. The brutality of
rule was endured in great part due to the use of force
against foreign threats. On numerous occasions during the
seventeenth century, Moroccan troops invaded Algeria and
battled Turkish troops to prevent encroachment into
Morocco.
As the need for manufactured goods grew, Morocco was
forced to allow European trading in the country. This
increase of European influence within Morocco coupled with
the Moroccan towns already in the hands of some European
powers worried the sultan. Spain held Ceuta, Melilla,
Badis,'and Alhucemas; England held Tangiers and Portugal
held Mazagan. To reduce this influence and to attempt
to recover their occupied territory, Morocco sought to
establish a military alliance with France.
One major problem within Morocco was that it did not
have a stable bureaucracy or representational bodies to
ensure government stability. What resulted was a govern-
ment which was dependent on a strong military to enforce
the sultans' will. Each successive sultan sought to estab-
lish his control over all of Morocco but normally could only
control parts. It is during the seventeenth century that
the Moroccan political concept of bled al-Makhzen and bled
as-Siba develops. The bled al-Makhzen being the portion
of the state where the governments writ ran and the people
have consented either voluntarily or by force to the dele-
gation of higher administrative powers to the sultan. The
24

bled as-Siba, on the other hand, is the land of permanent
tribal dissidence or where the inhabitants do not want to
delegate the right to administer themselves to the sultan.
The second quarter of the eighteenth century was a
period of war and anarchy throughout Morocco. With the
advantage of a strong army, the sultan was able to restore
order, defeat the dissidents and to improve relations with
13the European countries. The only major political problem
facing the government was the Berber question which was
worsening.
As Morocco enters the nineteenth century we again
witness increased European penetration as Morocco was
caught between choosing either modernization or isolation.
Morocco elected to maintain the status quo and we see the
nation drift towards colonization.
During this period the bled al-makhzen included the
area between Fez and Marrakesh and extending to the
Atlantic while the bled as-siba included most of the Rif,
the middle and high Atlas regions and the southern areas.
Realizing that he would be unable to control the siba, the
sultan granted them autonomy and recognized the authority
of the local chiefs. These tribes although refusing to
pay taxes to the throne still recognized the spiritual
authority of the sharif. We also see continued economic






The French involvement in Algeria finally brought
Morocco out of its period of isolation. In the mid
nineteenth century Moroccan troops stationed on the
Moroccan-Algerian border were defeated by French forces
which were pursuing Alerians. This stunning defeat sparked
tribal rebellions which in turn further increased French
and British involvement in Morocco, in fact Morocco became
fair game for any European power. Immigrants were pouring
into Morocco establishing schools, businesses, residences
and farms. Morocco attempted to stop European intrusion
by adopting western ways and increasing their technology.
This, however, had the opposite effect since it tended
to weaken the existing structure and further increase
European involvement in Morocco.
In 1906, a thirteen nation conference was convened to
preserve the sultans sovereignty, Moroccan territorial
integrity and an open door policy for commercial activity.
The Act of Algeciras was adopted on 7 April 1906 which
gave France and Spain control of Morocco's police and
finances. The sultan with no one to turn to was forced to
accept the decision. Spain began taking control of
northern Morocco while France was expanding to the south.
The sultan could do nothing, the tribes, however, contin-
uously battled' the French. The French finally defeated
the dissident tribes and on 30 March 1912, the sultan





Cultures never give way completely to the new, no
14
matter how ruthless the impact of innovation. This
situation particularly creates problems in the new
developing states where primordial attachments can cause
serious gulfs between the new state and the people. These
primordial attachments stem from the "givens" of social
existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly,
but beyond them the giveness that stems from being born
into a particular religious community, speaking a particu-
15lar language and following particular social practices.
Daiv Apter puts it more succinctly: traditionalism is
the validation of current behavior by reference to immemorial
prescriptive norms. It is primordial attachments that
are in direct opposition to modernization which assumes
a remote relationship between prior values and new goals.
There is no accurate yardstick to measure the effect of
these primordial attachments as they tend to vary from
society to society, however, we can identify the major
David Apter, Politics of Modernization
,
p. 8l.
15 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures,
p. 259.





factors which make up these attachments. They are assumed
17blood ties, race, region, language, religion and custom.
Looking at Morocco through these primordial attachments
one could expect to find a nation filled with civil strife.
Assumed Blood Ties - Here the nation is divided among Arabs
and Berbers. In the historical chapter, we witnessed the
Arab influx into the western Maghrib and their settling
along the coastal enclaves. The Berbers who had formed
the basis of the population of the Naghrib since 2000B.C.
were virtually untouched until the Arab influx in the
seventh century. Prior to the major European intervention
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century there
were two distinct splits in Moroccan society. These were
the Arab/Makhzen faction which was primarily Arabs along
the coastal plains and the Berber/Siba faction which was
primarily a rural tribal society. The rural population
within the land of Makhzen, like that of Siba remained
clustered in tribal groupings. There were, however, no
1 R
common kinship claims between the divisions.
Race - This is one area which does not lend itself to a
difference in primordial attachments between factions of
Moroccan society. Ethnically the nation is virtually
17 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures
,
p. 259-263, Basic Books, Inc., 1973-
1 R
Gellner, Saints of the Atlas
,
p. 3. University
of Chicago Presi~j 1969
.

unified with the exception of small pockets of Berber
speaking negro tribes.
Language - The national language of Morocco is Arabic,
however, only approximately sixty percent of the population
is estimated to speak Moroccan Arabic as the first language.
Of the approximately forty percent remaining who speak
19Berber as a first language, about half also speak Arabic.
There are several Berber dialects, however, with a little
difficulty they can be mutually understood. This is perhaps
the most significant difference between the two cultures
since it is so readily noticeable and acts as a constant
reminder of the other primordial differences between the
two groups. Based on linguistics, the Berber visualizes
himself only as a part of the tribal division which speaks
his dialect and not of a broader linguistically defined
ethnic group. The Arab, on the other hand correlates the
Berber language with a tribal society and one can assume,
based on Moroccan history, that the Arab would subconsciously
fear this grup as a possible threat to the current Makhzen
or central government.
Region - Morocco has been called "The island of the west"
by many Arab historians due to being cut off from the
rest of North Africa by the Atlas mountains and the Sahara
desert. The effect of this isolation has allowed Morocco
19Nyrop, R. F. and others, Area Handbook For Morocco
,
p. 1, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
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to proceed at its own rate of development while not being
unduly influenced by external forces. However, the moun-
tains which provided this favorable situation also influ-
enced internal political development. Due mainly to the
mountains, the problems of security and communications were
magnified. The various tribal regions of Morocco continu-
ously sought more autonomy from the Makhzen. However,
economic constraints insured that there was an overriding
need to belong to a Moroccan state. What we again witness
in Morocco is a- continuous struggle between the forces of
20
regionalism and the central power.
Religion - Although there are significant differences
between the urban religion of Morocco and the rural reli-
21gion, Morocco is a totally Islamic nation. This fact
has probably been the greatest common denominator in
Morocco and even today is able to transcend the majority
of Arab-Berber differences. The Berber or tribal version
of Islam with its many brotherhoods, holy men and lodges
has not proved to be a stumbling block to the nations
religious unity. The single unifying thread in Morocco
has been and still is Orthodox Sunnite Islam with the king
being imam, caliph and amir.
20
E. Burke, "Morocco and the Near East", Archives
Europeennes de Sociologie
,
v. 10, no. 1, 1969-
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For an excellent description of the basic differences
between urban and tribal religions see: Gellner, Saints
of the Atlas, pp. 6-9.
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Customs - The term custom actually incorporates all of
the other attachments. The custom differences between the
two segemtns of society are great and stem mostly from
those differences associated with tribal versus urban
society.
Now that we have briefly looked at the general pri-
mordial attachments of all traditional societies we must
try to correlate them to the modernization process in
Morocco. Traditional societies can be broken down into
the two sub categories of instrumental and consummatory
systems which are based on values. In an instrumental
system, the ultiamte ends of the society do not affect
every action whereas in a consummatory system, change can
produce fundamental social upheaval. According to T.
Parsons, "Instrumental" systems are those characterized
by a large sector of intermediate ends separate from and
independent of ultimate ends; "consummatory" systems are
those characterized by a close relationship between inter-
2°
mediate and ultimate ends. ~ Instrumental systems are
normally characterized by hierarchical authority and in
the case of Morocco headed by a king. In this type system,
change can be adopted and absorbed as long as the basic
system is not threatened. The basic fabric holding this
type of society together is the throne. This society will




function well until the basic principle of authority is
threatened at which time the system will no longer accept
change and the entire system will shift to another prin-
ciple of authority and a corresponding change in value
system. In this regard, Morocco partly fits the descrip-
tion of an instrumental system. The society is willing
to accept change which is filtered through the medium of
traditional institutions and made to serve tradition,
however, it is my contention that Morocco does not fit
exactly into the commonly accepted instrumental mold.
Morocco is willing to accept changes to affect moderniza-
tion' of the society and these changes are more readily
accepted when filtered through traditional institutions.
Morocco has faced numerous threats to the principle of
kingship without showing any signs of moving towards a
consummatory system. In fact the threats to alter the
basic kingship system have been fueled by both the Arab
and Berber factions of Moroccan society. In this regard
Morocco should more aptly be defined as a modified instru-
mental system. Normally when discussing the value system
of a traditional society whether instrumental or consumma-
tory we are discussing a society with common primordial
attachments. The basic difference between the societies
stemming from their systems of authority whether hierarchi-
cal or pyramidal. It is perhaps Morocco's advantage that
there are sufficient differences in the primordial attachments
that changes towards modernization do net affect Moroccan
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society as a unified body. There are sufficient threads
of commonality between the two segments which keep them
from flying apart at the seams. Historically, Morocco
has learned that for either faction to exist there must be
a certain amount of mutual cooperation. Islam though
differing in style has bound both Arab and Berber closer
and the geography of Morocco prohibits autonomy in todays
world. The basic premise of this type system is that the
kingship principle cannot be challenged. And yet in
Morocco the authority to the king is entirely different
in both factions of the society. Morocco's past is filled
with ambiguity over the role of the sultan as leader of
the country. As the political ruler of Morocco, his
authority was only accepted by the Makhzen and those other
areas which at various times came under the political control
of the Makhzen. The remainder of the nation rejected his
political authority but rallied behind him as their spiritual
leader based on his descendency from the Prophet Mohammed.
The Impact of Islam
According to Geertz, a religion is:
..."(1) a system of symbols which acts
to (2) establish powerful, pervasive and
long lasting moods and motivations in
men by (3) formulating conceptions of a
general order of existence and (4) clothing
of these conceptions with such an aura of
factuality that (5) the moods and motiva-
tion seem uniquely realistic". 3
23
C. Geertz, The Interpretations of Cultures, p. 90
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Religion and religious concepts extend beyond the realm
of the spiritual and actually provide a general framework
of ideas and thinkink patterns which permeate all aspects
of life in a traditional religious community. The impact of
relition and Islam specifically has a direct application to
the acceptance of political modernization in Morocco. We
shall see how Islam is more than a set of religious rules
for believers to follow but is rather a system of beliefs
and practices and a law for the community of believers.
The pre-Islamic arab thought only in terms of himself, his
family his tribe and his clan while the moslem was led to
think in terms of the political community coextensive with
the area of the faith. It changed the Arabs view of the
world from a division of tribes into one of believers and
non believers and the uncontestable relevance of Islam to
the modern state.
History in Islamic thought prior to the arrival of
Mohammed was a process which was leading to a more perfect
world which was culminated by the revelation of God's will
to the Prophet. Mohammed is viewed as the last of the
prophets and with his final revelations came perfection and
one could not expect any further improvement in the inter-
pretation of Divine law. This period is therefore viewed
as the golden age of Islam which leads to the natural
conclusion that moving away from this period can only move
one further away from the golden age. And the further one
moves away from this period the less chance there is of
34

living in accordance with the divine revelations. With
this view of history one can readily understnad the
Islamic importance placed on tradition. Once the perfect
message had been received, it would be wrong to attempt
to improve upon it. The ideal situation would be the
perfect imitation of the past. The exercise of judgment,
Ij tihad
,
has played an important role in the history of
Islamic thought. It is the search for the true meaning of
the Koran in regard to any given situation. However, the
orthodox theologians fearing individual interpretation have
closed the door on ijtihad. What results is that the
present generation and future generations are bound by
decisions of past generations and independent inquiry
cannot be tolerated. If the ancient method of ijtihad
were reestablished it could probably solve many of todays
problems, however, the fear is that the possibility exists
that Islamic law in its entirety would be threatened with
the ensuing collapse of Islam.
Coupled with this view of history is the mulims accept-
ance of predestination. God has given guidance to avoid
mechanical laws.
" Who hath ordained laws and granted
guidance . . . "24
" Nothing will happen to us except what
God has decreed for us. He is our
24 Quran, 37:3- The Muslim Students Association, 1975
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Protector and on God let the
believers put their trust. "25
Since God's will is inscrutable it is useless to try
and determine any cause and effect relationships. Man has
no ability to seek any other truths since God has wisdom
which man cannot comprehend and His reasons cannot be
questioned or doubted. Islam means submission to the will
of God.
" It is not fitting for a believer,
man or woman, when a matter has
been decided by God and His Apostle,
to have any option about their dec-
ision. If any one disobeys God and
His Apostle, he is indeed on a
clearly wrong path. "26
The muslim cannot place his wisdom in competition with
the wisdom of God. He must accept God's will loyally and
must place his will in accord with the will of God.
Since free will seems to be a crucial prerequisite of
27
achievement motivation stressed by McClelland," the lack
of free will as advocated by Islam would appear tobe an
obstacle to development.
The Islamic concept of the state also differs signifi-
cantly from that of the west and also has a profound effect
on the muslims idea of western political systems. Islamic
2SJ Quarn, 9:51, The Muslim Students Association, 1975.
?6 Quran, 33:36, The Muslim Students Association, 1975
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doctrine generally subordinates the state and the government
to the overriding goals of living one's life according to
the Koran and the rules revealed to Mohammed. This idea
is basic to Islam as revealed, however, the government
has historically been entrusted to the system of government
we know as the Caliphate. The function of the Caliphate
is to guarantee the maintenance of pure Islam in conformity
with its laws and to protect the faithful and defend them
agsinst heretics and unbelievers.
The holder of the office in the Caliphate is the Caliph
andis the defender of the faith, the dispenser of justice
andthe leader in prayer and war. What results is a total
intertwining of religious, social and political into one
integral unit. The muslim has come to expect a certain
perfection in his political organizations and should this
not be achieved in his mind then the feelings of political
obedience would not have to be adhered to. The Caliphate
is the only public office in Islam to have its own authority,
but the Caliph is still subjugated as are all muslims to
the sharia. Islamic theory recognizes the unity of church
and state under the Caliphate and was dependent on the
Caliph as the instrument and representative of the sacred
law. When the political systems in the muslim world diverged
from the theocratic ideal, the loyalty of the muslim to the
23
E.I.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam
,
p. 24, Cambridge University Press, 1958
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political head was no longer absolute. The first loyalty
of the muslim is to theideals and institutions of Islam
which could necessitate a negative attitude to the ruler.
We can therefore see the total interconnection and
interdependence of church and state within the Islamic
world.
When speaking today of political modernization and
westernization of the Arab world the impact of Islam is
profound. In order for a civilization to willingly accept
cultural change, a point has to be reached where the society
will have to admit to the inferiority of its system.
The problems are compounded in Islamic society where
admittance to cultural inferiority could undermine the
entire structure of its society.
Pre-protectorate Morocco had been conditioned through
custom and tradition to the patterns of social conflict.
It was in this environment that the extended family and
the immediate social group or the tribe formed the main
reference points for the individual. The individual
identified with a small closely knit group, normally a
part of the extended family, or close tribal relations
with established patterns of social conflict.
"Each section of atribe, from the
smallest to the largest, has its shaikh
shaikhs. The tribal system, typical
of segmentary structures everywhere, is
a system of balanced opposition between
tribes and tribal sections from the largest
to the smallest divisions, and there cannot
therefore be any single authority in a
tribe. Authority is distributed at every
point of the tribal structure and political
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leadership is limited to situations
in which a tribe or a segment of it
acts corporately. There cannot,
obviously, be any absolute authority
vested in a single shaikh of a tribe when
the fundamental principal of tribal struc-
ture is opposition between its segments,
and in such segmentary systems there is
no state and no government as we under-
stand these institutions; and criminal
law is absent and civil law exists in
only a very rudimentary form. "29
This hierarchically arranged system of segmental
opposition was fundamental to the feuding pattern of
Morocco. The tribes were divided amongst themselves
and between the various tribes to ensure an equal balance
As E.E. Evans-Pritchard points out: In political systems
where a central authority is either weak or non existant,
maintenance of tribal structure must rather be attributed
to opposition between its minor segments than to any
outside pressure.
"No group can be entirely harmonious,
for it would then be devoid of process and
structure. Groups require disharmony as
well as harmony, dissociation as well as
association, and conflicts within them are
by no means altogether disruptive factors...
on the contrary, both "positive" and "neg-
ative" factors build group relations. Con-
flict as well as cooperation has social
functions . "31
^D.M. Kart, 'The Tribe in Modern Morocco," in E. Gellner
and C. Micaud (eds), Arabs and Berbers , D.C. Heath and
Company, 1972, p. 28.
^0J E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer
,
Oxford University
Press, 19^0, p. 150.
^1J L. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict
,
p. 31,
The Free Press, 1956.
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It was precisely these conflict situations which
gave the Moroccan 1) A sense of assurance of predicting
the behavior of other and 2) Gave the tribe a certain
group cohesiveness in its struggle for survival. During
pre-protectorate Morocco the basic reference points for
a tribal member were the extended family and the clan.
In its institutional structure, Morocco was typical
of traditional societies. The Moroccan retained an
ascribed status in the community which was the product
of family lineage, clan connection and religiosity. He
was able to identify with a close kin or religious group.
In an exchange for some of his individual personality he
was assured of group solidarity. Within this tribal society
were sanctioned patterns of conflict based on a hierarhically
arranged system of segmental opposition. To achieve a
balanced opposition, tribes were subdivided down to the
extended family level which would ensure a balanced oppo-
sition through an allinace system. In the event of con-
flict, certain traditional rules were established and
adhered to and the conflicts could not be considered dis-
ruptive. The conflicts set boundaries between the groups
by strengthening group consciousness and awareness of
separateness , thus establishing the identity of groups
within the system. Even in defeat we do not see domination
of the defeated by the victor due to the nomadic nature
of the tribes. The defeated unit would either move to a
more favorable location or change his allinace groups to
40

form a more balanced opposition. Training for feuds began
during childhood and lasted to adulthood. It was a
learning process that taught skills in negotiating,
32
ancestry and rules of accepted conduct.
If we accept Gabriel Almonds view that the unit of
a political system is the role and that a political system
may be defined as a set of interacting roles then the
structure of pre-protectorate Morocco must be considered
stable. This is based on the fact that it involves a
set of complementary expectations concerning the actors
33
actions and those of others with whom he interacts.
Although providing a measure of stability to society,
this segmented society's patterns of conflict placed the
nation at a disadvantage when it began to emerge from a
predominantly tribal social structure. What we witness
is the minimal differentiation of political roles and
structures; and did not allow a distinct separation




The pattern of segmental opposition apparently did
not stop with independence in Morocco. A closer look at
32J W.H. Lewis, "Feuding and Social Change in Morocco,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution
,
v. 5, no. 1, p. 43-54,
March 1961.
^G.A. Almond, Political Development
,
p. 32, Little,
Brown and Company, Boston, 1970.
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the Moroccan political scene reveals similar practices of
alliances and factions continually in motion creating
new alliances with verbal attacks and accusations taking
the place of physical violence. We continually see
political activity and tension resulting in negligible
results. Major decisions at the national level are also
continually discussed but there are hardly any major
decisions made. This continual feuding among individuals
and parties can possibly be explained through the tradition
bound custom of feuding.
A Moroccan politician rises to a prominent position
within the party or government, his movements are very
similar to that of a segment of a pre-protectorate
alliance. We see continuous attempts to improve his
position while throughout the process avoiding any sort
of direct confrontation which would possibly force a
major shift in alliances. A feeling of continuous ten-
sion exists throughout the government but the tension
acts as a brake to ensure the status quo. It is in the
interests of all competing factions to ensure that the
system survives. The Moroccan politician is prepared for
all contingencies just as the traditional clans, he will
enter whatever political alliance is necessary to ensure
a balance. He will avoid direct confrontation with the
opposition to avoid a possible defeat by either side. The
King on the other hand acts as the supreme arbitor for the
entire system. The King will refrain from any political
42

decision which would measurably tip the scales in favor
of one faction over the ether. His interests lie in
keeping a balance between all opposition parties. His
position in todays political arena can be compared to
the Agurram of the Berber tribes whose function was to
remain neutral and perform the function of mediator between
the various alliances. In brief this holy man is the
force which maintains the system and gives political
stability to a system which without such a brake could be
total anarchy.
The Agurram is not a member of a tribe as the King
is not a party member but is involved in all aspects of
the life of his subjects. Another interesting corollary
is the religious association. The Agurraman aids the
tribesman in his Islamic identification with claims on
descent from the Prophet. The King in a s-milar vein is
descended from the Prophet and is the current imam.
The King is vital to the efficient operation of the
Moroccan system. As an arbiter he is also concerned in
the maintenance of the system to ensure his own political
relevance. He cannot eliminate the political factions
shince he would lost the intermediaries to the people.
He cannot join or create a political party since it could
result in his demise at the polls. The role he chose is
For an excellent description of the role of the
agurram in tribal Berber society see Ernest Gellner's
Saints of the Atlas, chpater three.
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to gain optimum control through the weakening of the other
parties without destroying any of them. One faction
will be rewarded by political favors and will reciprocate
by accepting blame for certain mistakes. Other parties
not blessed with favors are free to voice their disfavor
with the system giving credence to opposition groups in
36the system.
This type of system has had to pay a certain price for
this policy. The administration has grown enormously,
thus providing all at once a source of patronage and a
means of control and the need to balance one faction
against another creates its own internal stimulus to
growth. A political machine which grows in this fashion
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IV. FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES
AND ROLE OF THE KING
Political parties in Morocco were created by groups
of young intellectuals after the establishment of the
protectorate. Originally these groups were designed as
a medium for issuing protests to the French based on the
rights of Moroccans and their treatment by the French.
They were a direct result of the growth of nationalism in
the country and the original leaders did not have desings
on a political organization. However, the impact these
early movements had on Moroccan political development was
enormous. Apter states: "In the area of political moderni-
zation, no single role is of greater importance than that
of party politician. . . The political party is such a critical
force for modernization in all contemporary societies that
the particular pattern of modernization adopted by each is
quite often determined by its parties."
The Growth of Nationalism
Prior to the establishment of the French Protectorate,
Morocco was govened under a theocratic system which was
under the temporal and spiritual rule of the sultan. The
absolute power he had was tempered only by the various
^ D. Apter, The Politics of Modernization, p. 179
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interpretations of the Sharia. The arrival of the French
in Morocco causes drastic changes in Moroccan political
life. Although the French retained the traditional admin-
istration it was a parallel French administration which
actually ruled Morocco although their political dahirs
were issued through the traditional government. We are
going to look at the growth of nationalism in Morocco as a
direct result of the treatment afforded the Moroccans by
the French andthe French's non acceptance of the Moroccans
on an equal status with the French colons. It should be
mentioned that another underlying cause for the growth of
nationalism was also the impact of the western rational
system on the Moroccan traditional system. A typical
manifestation of this conflict of political cultures is
frequently charismatic nationalism and can be considered
in part as a movement towards accepting a new system of
political norms. The French goal in Morocco was mainly
to protect their prime interest which was Algeria by
insulating Algeria with a series of buffer states. In
addition they wanted to take advantage of Morocco by estab-
lishing a modern infrastructure, rebuilding the economy
and a total modernization of the nation. The favorable
environment in Morocco led to massive French investments
and immigration by French citizens to Morocco which resulted
39 G. Almond, Political Development, p. 40-41
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in the major portion of economic gains going to French
citizens and a corresponding decline in opportunities for
Moroccans. As more and more Moroccans demanded equal
treatment and equal opportunity we witness the growth of
the nationalist movement. Instead of dealing with the
issues and trying to appease the new nationalists, the
French attempt to counter it through a policy of divide and
rule. The French begin to enflame the age-old Berber-Arab
differences and attempt to creat dissension between the
40
sultan and the various tribes. It is at this point in
1926, that two nationalist societies were independently
formed by Allal al-Fassi and Ahmed Balafrej . These socie-
ties did not have much popular backing until 1930 and the
issuance of the Berber dahir by the French. This edict was
a further attempt by the French to divide the nation by
recognizing Berber tribal law within the Berber areas and
41
not having them adhere to the customary Makhzen law.
This had an effect opposite to that which the French had
40
L. Duclos, "The Berbers and the Rise of Moroccan
Nationalism", in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds), Arabs and
Berbers
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41 Samuel Huntington attributes the strength and survival
of many traditional systems to the colonial influence. I
feel, however, that in Morocco's case it is slightly differ-
ent. The area under direct French influence in Morocco
(the urban areas) moved rapidly away from traditional beliefs
while the rural areas remained traditional. The rural areas
were not entirely under French rule until the mid thirties
and it was shortly after this that the nationalist drive began
Huntington, S.P., "The Political Modernization of Traditional
Monarchies," Daedalus, v. 95, Summer i960, p. 763-787.
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anticipated and now the Berbers joined in the nationalist
struggle
.
In 193 ^ when France completed the occupation of Morocco,
a group of intellectuals formed the Committee d T Action
Marocaine (CAM) and presented the French with a list of
demands for reforms. They claimed the protectorate policy
was both racially and fiscally unjust and demanded that the
policy of direct administration be abolished and France
should become a technical advisor until self government
could be achieved. This marked the entry of the nationalists
into the political sphere. The French as expected con-
tinued their policy of refusing to deal with the nationalists
and refused to cnsider any of their reform demands. In
1937 the CAM evolved into the National Party for the reali-
zation of the Plan for Reforms and was headed by al-Fassi.
Al-Fassi can be classified as a liberal democrat in politics,
a socialist in economics and a progressive conservative in
religion. His entire political philosophy and outlook
was colored by his belief in the religious and political
unity of Islam. He encouraged the use of reason in the
acceptance or rejection of new ideas. A true nationalist
as he preached for Islam, country, education, use of arabic
and a modern Morocco. Politically he wanted an independent
Morocco with a government that was responsible to the
people and not tothe King and sovereignty vested in the
people through a constitutional monarchy. His new party
instigated demonstrations throughout the nation against the
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French and resulted in the exile of al-Fassi. During his
exile and through the early years of World War Two, the
nationalist movement slowed. In 1943 we see the creation
of the first organized political party with the creation
of the Istiqlal Party as an outgrowth of the CAM. In
January 1944 the new party demands full independence from
42
France. The impact of the Istiqlal Party and the moderni-
zation of Morocco cannot be overstated. For the first time
in Moroccan history, a political organization was going to
the people to arouse political interest. The use of the
communications media and the interest created among the
masses for political action has a direct link with the
speed of modernization. The party enters all aspects of
life and brings about new ideas and links the public and
the leadership in such a way that power is generated,
43
mobilized and directed.
The Growth of Political Parties
The rebirth of nationalism, the creation of the Istiqlal
Party and the demand for independence resulted in great
part from the conditions generated by World War Two. The
early French defeats in the war by the Germans resulted
in a severe loss of face for the French in the eyes of the
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Moroccans. The involvement of Moroccan soldiers in the
defense of Prance created a feeling in Morocco that
Moroccans had earned their freedom. Involvement with the
Americans also had an effect in bringing new hope through
44
reinforcing Moroccan ideas of independence.
The Istiqlal Party
After the end of the war, the party underwent drastic
changes in its organization and policy. The new policy
adopted by its leaders was geared to the education of its
members through a cell structure. These cells were designed
to complete the education of those party members educated
in the French system. The Istiqlal Party extended its
control to a number of lesser non-political organizations
which strengthened its political position as a force to
be reckoned with. In 1945, the Istiqlal appealed directly
to the United Nations for independence and this marked the
first time they had disregarded the French and had gone
directly to an international body. It was during this
period that the sultan was becoming more sympathetic towards
the policies advocated by the party. In the early part of
1946, Morocco was appointed a new Resident General. He was
no sooner established in office when the Istiqlal Party
presented him with their demands for the creation of a new
44
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government. Their demands included such things as the
basic freedoms for Moroccans and the release of political
prisoners. The French government responded with the release
of al-Fassi, Ouazzani and Balafrej. The Istiqlal Party
with new fervor with the return of its original founders
set its course on growth and recruitment. It was during
this period that the party was divided on the actions they -
should pursue towards independence. One group headed by
al-Fassi and Balafrej favored immediate independence
whereas Ouazzani T s faction looked toward a period of coop-
eration with the French and a grdual transition of power
within the government towards the final goal of independence
This split finally ruptured as the moderate group broke
off from the Istiqlal and formed the Democratic Party for
Independence (PDI) in 19^6. This party appealed mostly to
the middle class but did not receive the mass support they
had expected due mainly to the strength and organization
of the Istiqlal. In 19^7, the sultan who had been aligning
himself more closely with the Istiqlal Party, speaking in
Tangiers advocated many of the party's positions while
avoiding any of the customary praises for the French. This
resulted in a drastic change in French policy as they
45tightened their political control on Morocco. The
Istiqlal, realizing that their goal for independence was
hi;
^D.E. Ashford, Political Change in Morocco, p. 66-67
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not close at hand settled down to a long period of passive
resistance directed at the French. The sultan also manifested
his dissatisfaction through his threatened refusals to sign
various French dahirs . The following five years marked an
era of deteriorating relations between the Istiqlal Party
and the French. In 1951, French pressures finally forced
the sultan to disavow the Party and the Istiqlal responded
by joining forces with the PDI, the National Reform Party
and the Unity and Independence Party to form the National
Liberation Front. This new coalition sought immediate and
total independence from France. Simultaneously, the Istiqlal
had been infiltrating into Moroccan labor unions to orient
labor towards Moroccan independence.
The Violent Resistance Phase
The death of a Tunisian nationalist leader by Tunisian
police in December 1952 touched off an Istiqlal backed
protest strike in Casablanca. A violent two day struggle
ensued as the violent phase in the struggle for independence
began. The French reaction was to charge both the Istiqlal
Party and the Communist Party with collusion to provoke
insurrection and the Istiqlal was outlawed and forced under-
ground. In 195 3 a French dahir, which would have given the
French the right to vote in Moroccan elections was given to
the sultan to sign. This dahir would have instituted a
policy of co-sovereignty and the sultan refused to sign
since it violated the Treaty of Fez. Along with the support
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of al-Glawi, a powerful Berber chieftain, the French deposed
Mohammed V and established his cousin on the throne. What
followed was a public outpouring for the return of the King
from both Arab and Berber. Terrorism erupts throughout the
country as the role of the Istiqlal disappears with the
growth of the resistance movement and the formation of the
Liberation Army. Violence continues to increase throughout
the nation and terrorism was widespread with the only major
organized force being the Liberation Army. This army was
growing significantly in size and strength and by 1955 had
taken to attacking French units. The strength of the Liberation
Army and its threat of joining with Algerian forces, French
domestic problems and the Algerian war resulted in the
French allowing the return of the exiled sultan. The agree-
ment also included allowing the sultan to form a government
which would draft institutional reforms leading to the
46
establishment of a Constitutional Monarchy.
The Role of Mohammed V
During the French Protectorate days, the monarchy
although technically the legal head of state had virtually
no power since all politically important decisions concerning
Morocco were issued by the French through the King. There-
fore, when Mohammed V returned from exile he found himself
in a very peculiar position of going from a minimum of
46
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authority at the time of his exile to being the actual ruler
with all of the associated powers when he returned. This
lack of experience in the actual running of a government
would have great repercussions in the political handling of
Moroccan affairs. His reign could be characterized by no
major reforms and no political development. Mohammed V at
the time of his exile had been closely allied with the
Istiqlal Party which accounted in great part to his exile.
Upon his return it was only natural that this relationship
would not have been totally disrupted. The King also realized
that at the time of his return, Morocco continued to be
divided by numerous political factions held together by the
traditional conflict patterns. These factors more than
likely led him to the conclusion that a cnstitutional monarchy
with representational government would be best for the nation.
Prior to nis return to power, Mohammed V promised the Istiqlal
and the PDI that an independent Morocco would be a consti-
tutional monarchy. On November 18, 1955 upon his return from
exile he pledged to "establish democratic institutions which
will spring out of free elections . . . within the framework
47
of a constitutional monarchy." With all the different
factions, Mohammed V must have realized that for a new
independent Moroccan government to function properly he would
have to disassociate himself from a total alignment with
47
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the Istiqlal and give some important positions to other
parties. This author feels that to remain totally aligned
with the Istiqlal would at the very least have caused
serious problems in the Berber/rural areas. The King
therefore delegated many of his powers to the newly formed
government and to cabinet ministers and local appointed
officials. He chose a consultative assembly made up of
political parties, labor and business groups and religious
leaders who would meet, discuss and criticize government
action although at this time they did not have the power
to initiate reform. The King included the Democratic Party
in the first council of government and later included
ministers of the Liberal Independence Party in the second
council of government. These actions would help in his
goal to foster the growth of organized political opposition
to the Istiqlal. The nationalistic drive for independence
also demanded that he be a progressive leader and in keeping
with his previous statements must drive the nation towards
a democratic, representational form of government. The
Istiqlal during this period provided both advantages and
disadvantages for the King. They were powerful enough to
assist him in any political reforms they mutually agreed
upon but on the other hand they could also block any reforms
they were not in accordance with. Therefore the King resorted
to the traditional Moroccan practice of divide and rule
through his manipulation of rival political factions. This
manifested itself very well in the creation of the first
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government on December 7, 1955 in which the King gave only
ten of the twenty one cabinet posts to the Istiqlal Party
although their strength would have entitled them to a larger
number. Istiqlal support subsequent to independence was
still strong and due basically to the same political platform
they held during their drive for independence. The Istiqlal
still laid irredentist claims to those areas beyond her
borders to create the greater Morocco. They continually
espoused the idea of a representational government in the
form of a constitutional monarchy with individual and civil
liberties. Independence was still a goal but this time it
was to avoid interdependence with France. This new government,
due mainly to inexperience in government and a lack of
adequate preparation, did not produce any immediate signi-
ficant material gains the people had come to expect in the
nationalist drive culminated by independence. Unahppy with
governmental progress, the Istiqlal leaders threatened with-
drawal from the government. These extreme pressures from
such a powerful party forced the King to succumb and in
October 1956 the second government was formed which eliminated
48
the Democratic Party from an active role in government.
In 1956, Mohammed V outlined his proposed scenario to
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eventually achieve a constitutional monarchy. To initiate
the populace to a democratic form of government he called
for local election the following year, the creation of
regional assemblies and finally a constitutional assembly
to implement the constitution. The local elections,
however, were continually delayed due to his fears of
electing inexperienced political officials to important
positions. It was during the latter part of 1957 that we
see the formation of another opposition party. The Popular
Movement Part was a rural Berber looked upon favorably by
the King although he could not publically endorse it due to
the strength of the Istiqlal with whom it was competing.
The cry for elections was being sung by all parties but they
all differed on the type of representation. The Istiqlal
felt they were the most politically knowledgable and did not
advocate proportional representation which would foster the
growth of smaller parties and weaken their overall strength.
The PDI on the other hand advocated proportional representa-
tion while the new PM and the Liberal Independents sought
single member districts with the PM desiring it to be based
on tribal units. The Istiqlal ministers finally left the
government and the King was forced to create the third council
of government in April 1958. This new cabinet was composed
49
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entirely of Istiqlal Party members in all ministries and
50included an Istiqlal President and Vice President. The
new government with a good platform and the power that it
had sought for so long, suddenly became plagued with internal
51dissension. The political goals and ideas were boudn to
come to a head with such a diverse party membership. Party
leadership varied from the traditionalists (al-Fassi),
businessmen (Laraki), western oriented royalist (Balafrej
)
to left wing radicals (Ben Barka). The solidarity of the
Istiqlal Party had been preserved through the initial adjust-
ment to independence but at the disadvantage which was
currently manifesting itself in its lack of party preparation
for the future. The vast array of social and political
development problems eventually took its toll as individuals
within the party had different ideas on how to cope with
those problems. Major issues of dissension included the role
of the monarchy, the selection of delegates and the respon-
sibilities of the various Ministers. In January 1959 the
split came as Ben Barka with excellent support from Moroccan
labor broke with the Party. In September he forms a new
political front under the name of the National Union of
50
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52Popular Forces (UNFP). What we were witnessing in Morocco
was the problems associated with a rapidly modernizing
society that is adjusting well to the pressures of a new
government. The new parties were interested mostly in
internal politics with opposition focusing on other politi-
cal problems without resorting to widespread violence. We
did not witness opposition leaders attacking the new government
as being illegitimate but rather they took to the creation
of new political parties or splinter groups with their
sights set on reforms. One cannot underestimate the role
of the monarchy during these initial years of Moroccan
independence. In a newly modernizing nation the violence
usually erupts from the segment of society which is the
least politically astute. In Morocco, however, during this
period it was mostly to this segment of society, the rural
faction, that the King as religious leader provided them a
figure to rally behind. After independence, the Istiqlal
Party was rapidly converting the Moroccan political system
into a single party stare and yet by 1959 the Party had
split, minsters had left the Istiqlal, newspapers had
appeared and instead of having one party with different
groups, Moroccan politics had progressed to the organization
of interest parties. Immediately after independence member-
ship in the system was equated with allegiance to the King
52
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and not to a political organization. He legitimized the
system through his traditional position as head of state
and of religion and through his leadership in the struggle
for independence. Mohammed V was intelligent enough to
see the dangers of a single party state and while seeking
party loyalty to the throne he set out to weaken the Istiqlal
Party without destroying it. He was successful in encouraging
other parties, keeping the army loyal to him through his
son the Crown Prince and appointed governors loyal to him
5 3
to the various provinces. By I960, the government was
comprised mostly of members of the UNFP, some of which
were becoming more vocal about their dissatisfaction with
the monarchy. With Crown Prince Hassan raking a more active
role in politics, the monarchy began to take a turn away
from its traditional position as arbiter and began to align
itself more with the conservatives while in the process
alienating themselves from the leftist parties, namely the
UNFP.
In 1961, the unexpected death of Mohammed V carried
Crown Prince Hassan to the throne. The death of his father
actually eased his transition to power as the nation mourned
for Mohammed V. Realizing that he must generate some politi-
cal support, one of his first actions as King was to delegate
some monarchial duties to cabinet members who supported the
53 Zartman, I.W., Political Pluralism in Morocco, Govern -




throne. Also to ensure the continued support of the con-
servative parties he reorganized the cabinet. Hassan knew
that without Istiqlal support, the possibility existed for
a reunion of the Istiqlal and the UNPP with the eventual
result being a single party state. The new cabinet ensured
Hassan of conservative support and he could now direct his
attention to the left wing UNFP.
The politically astute Hassan had successfully made the
transition to the throne despite his former image as a
western playboy. However, this honeymoon would not last
unless he could fulfill the promise of his father that the
nation would have a constitution by 1962. The expectation
of the people as well as the parties had once again been
flamed. Hardly any work had been done on the new constitu-
tion and Hassan was being pressured for time. He sought
French help and in a relatively short time they produced a
document patterned after the French constitution of 1958.
In short, the new constitution consolidated his power and
virtually kept all the powers he held previously and in
addition it gave him emergency powers to dissolve the govern-
ment ahould the constitution be threatened. It also pro-
hibited the formation of a single party state and that cabinet
posts need not be based on proportional representation of
the parliament. The new constituion was placed on a national
referendum ballot in December 1962 and received mixed support
from the parties. The UNFP elected to boycott the election
61

since the new constitution did little in the way of demo-
54
cratic reform. The small communist party directly opposed
it while the Istiqlal and the remaining parties supported
it. When the results were in, the popular vote definitely
supported Hassan as ninety six percent of the voters were
55pleased with the constitution. This vote cannot be con-
sidered as overwhelming support since the voters only had
a yes or no alternative and one could draw the conclusion
that any constitution would be a step in the right direction
even though it did not contain all of the desired features.
The next major political test for the King was the
House of Representatives election set for May 1963. With
unofficial support from the monarchy, a new political party
was formed comprised of conservative and rural elements.
Their platform consisted mainly of support for Hassan and
advocated economic reforms and support for the constitu-
tional monarchy. With this new party, Front pour la'Defense
des Institutions Constitutionelles (FDIC), created in March
561963 the King expected to sweep the elections. Estimates
of FDIC success in the elections were that they would receive
as many as one hundred and ten seats in the 144 man house.
When the results were counted, the FDIC had received 34 percent
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of the vote and had won sixty nine seats. The Istiqlal
Party took 30 percent and forty one seats while the UNFP
had 22 percent of the vote and won twenty eight seats.
Independents had 14 percent of the vote and six seats in the
58house. The failure of the FDIC to obtain their forecasted
number of seats was due in great part to the superior organ-
ization of the Istiqlal and the UNFP. In addition, many
rural votes were lost to independent candidates when former
backers of the Popular Movement resented the anticipated
domination of their party by urban politicians. The result
of this election produced the expected response by the
monarchy to try and diffuse some of the strength of the
Istiqlal and the UNFP. The government, with questionable
evidence arrested several Istiqlal deputies and followed
this with the arrest of hundreds of UNFP members and party
leaders charging them with subversive activities against the
state. The result of this was that all opposition parties
intensified their verbal attacks on the regime which ham-
pered effective government operation. A timely border war
with neighboring Algeria during the latter part of 1963
managed to rally the country and the political parties
behind the monarchy in a show of national solidarity. The
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portion of the border in question had been a problem area
and had been disputed by Morocco since independence, however,
the conflict seemed to occur at a very opportune time. This
border area had not been legally defined throughout Morocco's
protectorate period and once independence was achieved
Morocco decided to await the outcome of the Algerian conflict
before trying to resolve the issue. However, once Algeria
received their independnece they were nor very receptive to
the idea of ceding a portion of their new nation to Morocco.
Relations between the two nations gradually strained and
finally when Morocco accused Aleria of supporting rebels
which were attempting to overthrow the Moroccan regime the
crisis came to a head. Border clashes increased and finally
Morocco invaded Alergeria and moved deep into the disputed
areas. Major battles ensued with Morocco definitely the
victor, however, Morocco did not obtain the territory.
With this military victory, Morocco again returned to the
problems of domestic politics as the king inaugurated the
new parliament. The new parliament was declared illegal by
both the Istiqlal and the UNFP on the grounds that the
elections had been rigged and that the King still held all
of his former powers and could override any decisions taken
by the parliament. Additionally, the King had antagonized
the Istiqlal Party by totally eliminating them from the new
59 The New York Times, October 15, 1963, p. 1
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government. Fearing the polarization of these two major
opposition parties, the monarchy again encouraged the forma-
tion of yet another political party, the Democratic Socialist
Party (PSD) which was formed in 1964 and answered the public
fid
outcry for more socialist reforms. The UNFP and the
Istiqlal began to undermine the Kings position, while at the
same time the FDIC began to crumble as the individual coali-
tions within the Party were demanding more representation
in return for their support for the King. As Hassan witnessed
his loss of control of the parliament he declared a state of





The basic problem stemmed from the belief by the opposi-
tion that the King was unbending, relying only on total
support which was resulting in direct rule. The Moroccan
tradition of balanced opposition was being eroded and the
King was no longer the arbiter of balanced political parties.
The King needed time to regroup and during the next several
years would attempt to restore the original image of the
Monarchy. During the next several years the democratic
process could not be found in MOrocco as Hassan appointed
a new council of ministers and took full legislative and
fid
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executive powers. This period was not toally devoid of
accomplishments as many reforms were initiated and imple-
mented with the continued promise of new elections and a
new constitution.
It was not until 1970 that a new parliament was elected
and a revised constitution approved. The new parliament now
consisted of one branch as opposed to the previous parlia-
ment with two branches. It would be composed of 240 represen-
tatives of which ninety would be elected by the people,
ninety by local councils and sixty appointed. The powers
of the King were substantially increased to the point where
it appeared that the nation was being governed by an absolute
monarch througxh the facade of an elected parliament. It was
no wonder that the elections were boycotted by all opposition
parties and the labor unions. The opposition parties hopes
had been shattered and this brought the Istiqlal Party and
the UNFP together in a National Front to oppose the monarchy.
The National Front claimed that the new parliament was de-
signed to provide a built in majority for the King and
that the constitution did not contain any relinquishing
of power by the King. The opposition party also claimed
that the referendum vote had been rigged in favor of the
monarchy and the high percentage figure showing support for
6 P
the king did not reflect the true feelings of the people.
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This referendum vote on July 25th resulted in almost unani-
mous approval for the new constitution proposed by the King.
A-cording to Ministry of Interior figures, 4,498,662 votes
were cast with 4,443,561 in favor and 55,101 against for a
percentage of 98.7 favoring the new constitution. Through
the next year popular support for the King was on the decline
as illustrated by worker strikes, student riots and through
the voice of the National Front. On July 10, 1971 Morocco
experienced the first of two attempts on the life of the
King. Both of these attempts were by the military and many
observers thought that this demonstrated the gradual collapse
of a civilian-military alliance or perhaps the collapse of
a clientele relationship which King Hassan had nurtured
whilewhile he was Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and
since he acceded to the throne. However, with the exception
of several high ranking generals who were politically moti-
vated, the majority of the participants in these events
64
were not aware that it was in fact a coup attempt.
In August, the new government was appointed which did
not include any members of opposition parties. This further
incensed the opposition who stepped up their campaign against
the monarchy. The King had additionally lost a great portion
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of his military support due to the coup and the resulting
army reorganization. To bolster his popular support he
instituted a series of reforms to increase wages, reduce
taxes and income tax, eliminate corruption and a land
redistribution program to enlist support from the rural
65
masses. Realizing his predicament, reforms were promised
for the following year which would include a new government,
a new parliament and the third constitution. Hassan agreed
to relinquish some of his powers and to allow participation
in the government by the opposition parties. The new reforms
were to greatly increase parliamentary power and corres-
pondingly reduce that of the monarchy. The King, however,
would still retain the right to overrule parliament in addi-
tion to the power to seize the government in the event he
felt that the constitution was being threatened. The elec-
tion of parliament was also changed to allow two thirds of
the body to be elected through direct vote and the remaining
one third by local groups which reversed the pattern of the
66former constitution. The new reforms preserve the monarch's
position as Commander of the Faithful and absolute master in
the choice of his successor. He also remains the sole judge
in determining which events justify the proclamation of a
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state of emergency and was still allowed to dissolve the
parliament. During this time period we are also witnessing
a change in the traditional view of the monarchy. The older
generation still felt the need for a King but many university
students agreed with the UNFP position that the King if
required should reign and not rule.
In August 1972 the second attempt is made on Hassan's
life and once again the attempt came from the military,
however, the King blamed the instability of the political
parties for the mutiny of the military. The opposition
was still demanding a new constitution to redefine the role
of the King and demanded a government controlled by the
people. The major parties refused a call by the King to
join in a cabinet of National Union to form a new government.
The new government once again contained no members of oppo-
sition parties. A period of semi-dictatorial rule follows
as the promised elections and the principle of a constitu-
tional monarchy are placed aside. The leftist UNFP party is
banned and many of its leaders are arrested for alleged
terrorist activities. Morocco undergoes a period of unrest
which is highlighted by plots, trials, jailings and executions
These events coupled with Kings promise of new legislative
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elections in 1975 leads to the creation of several new
opposition political parties during 197^. During 1975,
however, the King was once again to delay the elections due
to situation in the Western Sahara. Hassan promised the
70
elections once the Western (Spanish) Sahara issue is resolved.
This reason satisfied both the people as well as the politi-
cal parties since Morocco was fighting a desert war against
Spanish troops and then against Polisario troops. The King
received additional support and the nation rallied behind
him for his famour "Green March" in which 350,000 Moroccans
were scheduled to cross the Moroccan border in a peaceful
march to occupy the Western Sahara. The march ended success-
fully for Morocco and was culminated with the Tripartite
agreement in November 1975 between Spain, Mauritania and
Morocco. The entire Western Sahara issue was a godsend for
Hassan who desperately needed national support. In April
1976 the Western Sahara issue finally came to a close as
Morocco and Mauritania signed an agreement dividing up
the former Spanish territory.
The King in keeping with his promise scheduled parlia-
mentary elections for the following year. The first phase
of the election process began in November 1976 with the
first local elections since 1969. A total of 42,607
7
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candidates ran for 13,358 seats in balloting which was
intended to prepare for the election of a new parliament
71
under a new constitution. The results of the election
identified the biggest winners as non party candidates who
won 8,607 seats, followed by the Istiqlal with 2,184 seats,
the PM with 1,045 and the USFP with 874 seats. The results
also indicated strong support for Hassan since most of the
independent candidates were supporters of current policies
but had not jelled together sufficiently for the formation
of political parties. The parliamentary elections in June
of this year were equally impressive as support for King
Hassan's policies. Of the 176 seats being voted on, indepen-
dents received eighty one while seats for the remaining
parties were: Istiqlal (45), PM (29), USFP (lo) and other
72parties (5). During the June elections King Hassan was
careful to avoid any endorsement of a party or a candidate.
The independents were so successful because having the politi-
cal process back in operation allowed the major parties to
attack each other to the benefit of the independents. It
almost appears that the King has gone the full circle and
we have returned to the traditional role of the Moroccan
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It does appear that the King realizes that the nation is
maturing politically and is ready to accept the reins of
government. Within the very near future we should witness
the total relinquishing of legislative and executive powers
as the nation finally achieves the constitutional monarchy




In examining Morocco after independence it becomes
increasingly difficult to try and identify the elite class.
We should not make the mistake in Morocco of only including
within the elite class, only those individuals who have
either been elected or appointed to various high political
offices. There certainly cannot be any doubt that these
positions are important, however, we cannot restrict ourselves
to them alone. We must examine the entire spectrum of
Moroccan society in search of other groups or persons which
play a significant role in domestic and international
political decisions.
The question of elite selection depends on how one
approaches the problem. Are the elites a separate group
within the country who think and act in ways which differ-
entiate them from the rest of society or rather are they
those individuals within the society who maintain positions
of power and authority with no specific differentiating
characteristics from the rest of that society? It therefore
becomes necessary to establish certain boundaries prior to
discussing elites if one selects the latter. I feel that
this is the case so we must therefore arbitrarily select
certain groups of people within Moroccan society and examine




Prior to discussing elites we should initially establish
some definition of what it is we are discussing. One of the
more widely accepted all encompassing definitions is that
of Harold Lasswell: "The study of politics is the study of
influence and the influential . . . The influential are those
who get the most of what there is to get . . . Those who get
the most are elite; the rest are mass." In studying
elites one normally establishes some correlation between
social status and the political power those persons wield.
As stated earlier, a common approach is to just select the
high office holder. A more realistic approach is to search
for some functional criteria to identify the real elite.
This obviously unveils an array of arbitrary decisions. To
begin the discussion of Moroccan elites we start by examining
the political change which has occurred as Morocco progressed
from a traditional society. Prior to 1912 and the establish-
ment of the French protectorate one could readily determine
the elite class. As in most traditional societies there is
a great disparity between the "have's" and the "have-not's".
These differences can manifest themselves ethnically or
culturally but always in terms of class position and func-
tions. In addition there is normally very little interaction
between the two classes except for minor peasant revolts.
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What we do witness, however, is the political interaction
between the aristocrats which manifests itself in dynastic
74
changes and boundary changes.
Prior to the establishment of the protectorate, Moroccan
society was organized in such a way as to preclude the for-
mation of a national ruling class. Morocco did not have a
state structure which could be recognized by western stan-
dards, nor did they have a ruling class which fit into the
western models. The primary reason for this was the politi-
cal division of the country into the Blad al Makhzan and the
Blad as Siba. The only recognized elites during this time
were the ruling Makhzen families which had contact with
European countries. Within the Siba there was no ruling
class as such, since the leadership of the various tribes
was passed along to different families. The situation
within the Makhzen was considerably different and the firmly
established ruling class consisted of merchants, the
makhzen families employed by the government and the descen-
dants of the prophet who held political as well as religious
roles
.
During the first decade of the twentieth century,
problems in Morocco increased which led to the establishment
of the protectorate. The interaction between the Moroccan
traditional state and the French modern industrial state
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produced the growth of a group of modernizers within Morocco.
This group consisted mainly of young people from upper middle
class merchants and the established ruling class. This was
due in great part to French education system which will be
discussed later. This newly formed educated group could
be regarded as intellectuals and they acquired professional
skills and values normally reserved for a modern society.
In order to achieve their goals of rapid modernization
within their nation this new group of modernizers had to
obtain control of the government. They did not have the
required capital or backing to modernize, nor did they
trust foreign investment so the only avenue left open was
control of the government to affect their goals. To achieve
this goal they had to remove all vestiges of foreign
colonialism, remove the native aristocracy and be able to
influence governmental decisions.
These new modernizers had three main orientations:
Nationalitarian/Scripturalist - This group characterized
the Moroccan rennaissance . They stressed the use, revision
and celebration of their Islamic heritage and the use of
Arabic. The colonial situation was in direct conflict with
this group which was led by Allal al-Passi.
Liberal Modernization - This group was characterized by those
intelligentsia who were exposed to the European experience
and wanted to reshape Moroccan society along European lines.
This group was in turn split into two factions in which the
76

first only demanded participation in the political process
and the second which called for total mobilization against
the colonial regime.
Radical Intelligentsia and Workers - This last group wanted
a totally new scheme of social organization involving self-
management and cooperative organization. The main figure
75in the last group was Mehdi ben Barka.
These were the thre main focuses of the new modernizers
in Morocco and even at this writing it is difficult to
ascertain which group predominated in the amalgam that
resulted. Many of these new modernizers have since been
incorporated into the bureaucracy and are a part of todays
elite class.
According to Octave Marais, the political class of
Morocco today consists mainly of those personalities coming
from the higher ranks of the Istiqlal Party or those high
appointees made by the King. According to Marais, there has
been a permanent break with the old ruling class. He does
concede, however, that familial ties from pre-protectorate
days helped to prevent too drastic a purge. He goes on to
say that the political class today numbers less than one
thousand and includes politicians holding positions in
government, the political parties, trade unions and individuals
75Hermassi, E., Leadership and National Development in
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in high administrative positions. Additionally he includes
any religious whose position could be used for political
influence. This group includes religious leaders within
the towns and in the Berber tribes. The military senior
officers are included since they appear as a more or less
homogeneous group
.
The Marais figure of one thousand is corroborated by
Waterbury who includes all Moroccans who have an actual or
potential influence on decision making and the distribution
of spoils and patronage and who articulate occasionally
77
or persistantly their demands. The total elite class
according to Waterbury numbers one thousand and eighty and
is broken down as follows: 100 army officers; 450 adminis-
trators of the Ministry of the Interior; 300 officials in
the rest of the administration; 130 prominent politicians
and union leaders; and 100 members of economic organizations,
78independents and ulema. He does admit that there is a
degree of overlap between the various categories.
Although Marais tends to downplay the role of kinship in
the current Moroccan elite I tend to feel that the present
7'fit
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elite today is an outgrowth of the pre-protectorate elites.
Familial ties in Morocco are still extremely strong and
it is the sons of the wealthy influential families who had the
opportunity for educational advancement. If there is any
one characteristic which would set apart todays elite from
the rest of Moroccan society it is education. In a country
where eighty percent of the population are illiterate, the
elite are a minority. Additionally, these educated Moroccans
were almost all educated during the protectorate years under
an educational system which was based on an elite class.
A typical French saying was: "When the Portuguese colonized,
they built churches: when the British colonized, they built
trading stations; when the French colonize, they build
79
schools." The French with a pride and self-confidence
in their own culture had a profound effect in creating
native elites. The French applied their system of education
to Morocco in an attempt to alter any pre-existing cultural
patterns. The French approached the white mans burden with
cultural enlightenment.
Initially in the formative years of a French educated
society, students learn the general knowledge required by
all literate people of that society. Once completed, secon-
dary educated is intended to train a special class. The
entire education system is highly centralized and emphasized




clarity in thought and expression and gave the student the
ability to syntthesize and analyze. However, since World
War Two, the French have placed more empahsis on technical
fin
training. The French colonizers, proud of their heritage
and convinced of the superiority of their culture felt it
their duty to enlighten the colonized to French culture
while destroying the cultural heritage of the colonized.
The Moroccan elites who are currently in positions of
prominance can be 2ategorized as the second generation
elites. This group is the last to have the French educational
system available to them. This is the group which was
attending French secondary schools during the ten year period
following World War Two until independence. According to
Douglas Ashford, this group numbers approximately ten
31thousand. The commonality of education for second genera-
tion Moroccans from the Makhzen as well as from the Siba
has resulted in an almost total acceptance of the tribal
members into those political and social structures formerly
rrserved for urban families alone.
These elites educated under the French system had the
advantage of a quality with the obvious drawback of an
erosion of their traditional beliefs. With independence
fin
Clement H. Moore, North Africa, p
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from France came an awareness by the first generation elites,
those who were directly involved in obtaining independence,
that educational growth, modernization and economic expansion
were immediate goals of the new nation. To achieve these
goals, Morocco embarked on an educational plan which was
designed to replace all vestiges of France within adminis-
trative positions throughout the nation and also to supply
the technicians and trained professionals necessary to
accomplish the desired economic growth. Morocco had to
train the largest number of technically qualified persons
on all levels of industry while also training sufficient
personnel to establish an education system necessary to
maintain an output of qualified personnel to continue the
Op
process. The education explosion which has occurred in
Morocco has had some serious repercussions. Due to these
pressures for mass education at all levels and the lack of
facilities and educators, the result has been a lowering of
educational standards at all levels. These newly emerging
elites, or the third generation, educated entirely without
the benefit of French education could present serious problems
in the future. This new group, having the same goals,
desires and expectations as their predecessors will not be
readily accepted into administrative positions commensurate
with the views they hold of their own competance. The
O p
For an excellent article on the Moroccanization of
Morocco, see Charles F. Gallagher, North Africa Series,
vol. IV, No. 2.
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THE GROWTH OF THE IN-SCHOOL POPULATION OF MOROCCO 3
LEVEL 1953 1956 1961 1965
Primary 157,000 292,000 856,525 1,100,000
Secondary 4,648 28,000 60,291 174,000
Advanced 2,800 4,639 9,297
subsequent generation, the fourth generation, which will be
coming into prominance during the next decade has had the
advantage of an education system which has finally gotten
on track and is producing a quality product. Therefore, one
can conclude that the group of elites to watch during the
next several years is the third generation. If this group
can be satisfied with secondary administrative positions
and be content with not assuming those positions of leadership
currently held by the French educated elite, Morocco should
peacefully progress to a constitutional form of represen-
tative government. This will occur with a peaceful transi-
tion of political power from the second generation of
34
elites to the fourth generation of elites.
On










VI. MOROCCAN FOREIGN POLICY
The makeup of Moroccan society and its history of
segmental opposition coupled with the growth of political
parties representing these various factions have played a
major role in determining the path of Morocco's foreign
policy. With traditionalist opposing modernist, rural
versus urban, Arab against Berber and the everpresent influ-
ence of Islam it seems natural that Morocco would find it
difficult to align itself with nations which would meet
the approval of all segments of Moroccan society. The
course selected by Mohammed V proved to be an ideal compro-
mise as Morocco's foreign policy since independence has
been geared to non-alignment.
Independence found Morocco without an army, foreign
troops and bases were firmly entrenched on Moroccan soil
and territories which were historically claimed by Morocco
under foreign flags. It was these conditions which directly
influenced their foreign policy in the years following
independence
.
Organization of the Army
At independence, Morocco continued to be occupied by
an 85,000 man garrison of the French Army and a 60,000 man
garrison of the Spanish Army. Therefore, a primary task
of the newly formed government was to establish and organize
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the Royal Armed Forces (FAR). Speed was important since
the presence of a war in Algeria presented a situation
where either of the warring factions could exercise pressure
on Morocco. Morocco also required a police force to resolve
domestic disturbances. The formation of the new army was
planned to replace the foreign troops and remove them from
Moroccan soil.
During the same month in which Morocco received its
independence, the King created the Ministry of National
Defence and the General Staff. The plans called for a
national army of 20,000 men with the King as Commander in
Chief. The army would consist mainly of Moroccan soldiers
who had served with either the French or Spanish forces.
This army would be geared for external defense and internal
security in addition to acquiring a French related trait
of performing social work.
The haste in establishing the army manifested itself
in many ways over the next several years. The role of
the army was unclear, its enemy was not defined and the
borders they were to defend were also ambiguous. There
was never any concept of border defenses nor any operational
plan for the defense of the frontier. Despite these defi-
ciencies, Morocco had an army although it lacked trained
personnel and quality leadership. During this same year a
small air force was also established but it was not until
I960 that the navy was formed.
84

Today, in spite of its shaky beginnings, the Moroccan
armed forces have developed into an effective force. The
army has a total strength approximating 55,000 men, the air
force about 4,000, the navy 2,000 and the various internal
security forces number about 40,000 men. Chart 1 depicts
the Moroccan force structure and equipment inventory.
The major impact of the Moroccan armed forces on foreign
policy has been due to the tensions which have existed and
continue to exist with neighboring Algeria and Morocco's
search for arms suppliers. Since independence, Morocco has
had to depend on foreign suppliers for its military aid.
Morocco has obtained its defense requirements from six
nations. Although Morocco leans towards the West, they
utilize a multiple supplier relationship in obtaining their
desired arms in order to follow their independent path in
foreign affairs. Morocco's dealings with western nations
and Soviet bloc nations will be discussed in the following
chapter.
Intra-African Relations
Morocco's involvement in intra-African affairs began
in 1958 with their participation in various pan-African
85
conferences. Morocco has attempted to obtain as much
support from the other African nations mainly to improve
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Source: DMS Market Intelligence Report , Defense Marketing
Service, Inc., Los Angeles, September, 1976.
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its prestige in the worlds eyes and also to enlist their
support on various issues at international organizations
such as the United Nations. Two such incidents have been
the issue of Moroccan independence and the Mauritania
question. In I960 Morocco took an active role in African
affairs when it responded to a United Nations plea for
or
military support. Morocco furnished in excess of three
thousand troops to the Congo, however, they were removed
soon after when Mohammed V was dissatisfied with the United
o y
Nations operations. Several other states also dissatis-
fied joined with Morocco in the creation of the Casablanca
Group which collapsed shortly afterwards. Morocco also
supported several African organizations in their fight for
independence. Supporting one of the Angola factions caused
Morocco to sever relations with Portugal. With the creation
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, Morocco
has taken a more active role in African affairs.
Algeria - Relations between MOrocco and Algeria have been
primarily shaped by territorial disputes. Throughout the
protectorate period there were several areas between Morocco
and Algeria which had never been precisely defined. Immed-
iately following independence Morocco could not get Prance to
discuss the disputed territory. The Algerian war of independence
or
The New York Times
,
July 15, I960, p. 1:2.
'The New York Times, December 13, I960, p. 5:3-6
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complicated the issue slightly and the Algerian Provisional
Government agreed to discuss the issue after independence.
Once the war was over Algeria was reluctant to give up any
of its newly found nation. Tension mounted and troops from
both nations began massing on the borders with border
88
skirmishes. Morocco finally advanced into Algerian terri-
tory inflicting serious losses on the Algerian forces
The OAU entered the area to mediate the dispute as Morocco
90departed. The OAU was successful in their mediating and
with a few exceptions there were no more incidents. Morocco
had scored a significant military victory at the expense
of some diplomatic setbacks for initiating the conflicts.
After peace was restored in the area relations between the
two appeared to improve. The losses inflicted upon Algeria
during the conflict turned Algeria towards the Soviet Union
to improve their military posture. This started a small
arms race in North Africa as the Soviet Union supplied arms
91
to Algeria and Morocco turned to the United States.
Relations between these two states have not been warm since
the war although there have not been any additional conflicts
between Moroccan and Algerian forces . Serious attempts have
88
The Mew York Times
,
October 1, 1963, p. 1:8.
8q^
The New York Times
,
October 15, 1963, p. 5:4.
9 °The New York Times
,
October 31, 1963, p. 1:8.
91The New York Times, October 30, 1963, p. 1:1 and 3:1-2

even been made towards unity and a "Greater Maghreb" involving
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, however, political differences
have prevented any success. More recently, the success
Morocco has experienced in the Western Sahara has once again
renewed problems with Algeria. Algeria desired to have an
independent Sahara which would have ensured them access to
Atlantic ports. Algeria is presently supplying arms, techni-
cal assistance and training to the Polisario Front which is
seeking to set up an independent Saharan Arab Democratic
REpublic. Military observers suggest that Polisario has
little chance of achieving its objective its objective by
92
military means alone. This has caused problems for
Morocco and reports indicate that Morocco has increased the
size of their army an additional 30,000 troops to handle the
9 3
situation in the Sahara. In the November 1976 municipal
elections in Morocco, the voter turnout in the Sahara was
the heaviest with over eighty percent of the 17,000 electorate
94
voted. There does not seem to be any end in sight for the
Polisario problem as it continues to keep relations tense
between Morocco and Algeria.
Mauritania - For the same historical reasons that Morocco
laid claim to other portions of North Africa they also
9 Africa Research Bulletin , "POLISARIO Struggles On,"
May 1-31, 1976, p. 4029-4030.
^"POLISARIO Congress," Africa Research Bulletin
,
September 1-30, 1976, p. 4l4B^
94
"Results of Municipal Elections," Arab Report and Record
,
1-15 November 1976, p. 669.
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claimed Mauritania. During the early fifties, the Istiqlal
Party first raised the issue of a "Greater Morocco" which
included Mauritania. This concept was first supported by
95the monarchy during the early part of 1958. During i960
through 1963, Morocco took their claims on Mauritania to
the Arab League, the Casablanca Bloc and the United Nations
to try and muster sufficient support for their claims and
to prevent Mauritania's entry into the United Nations.
Morocco received some support and with the aid of the veto
power of the Soviet Union was able to delay but not prevent
96Mauritania's admission to the United Nations. Relations
between Morocco and Mauritania have never been bad even
though Morocco refused to recognize the existence of the
Mauritanian state. It was not until 1970 that Morocco
extended full diplomatic recognition to Mauritania. Relations
between the two have since improved steadily and they are
allies against the Polisario in the desert war in the former
Spanish Sahara which has since been divided between Morocco
and Mauritania. The significance of Mauritania in Morocco's
foreign policy was most evident during the late fifties and
early sixties. It was during this period that supporters
of Morocco's claims had a direct impact on the conduct of
9 ^The New York Times
,
March 29, 1953, p. 3:4.
9 The New York Times, October 28, 1961, p. 5:1
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Morocco's claims had a direct impact on the conduct of
Morocco's foreign affairs and how they voted on inter-
national issues. This will be covered in greater detail
in the following chapter.
Relations with Spain
Morocco's relations with its northern neighbor have also
been influenced by territorial issues. The areas under
Spanish control at the time of Moroccan independence
included the Spanish Sahara, the Mediterranean cities of
Ceuta and Melilla, Ifni, Velez, Alhucemas and the Shafarin
Islands. Despite military skirmishes between Moroccan and
Spanish forces particularly in the Spanish Sahara, relations
between the two nations have been through normal diplomatic
channels with numerous state visits to resolve the disputed
territories. The willingness of Morocco to engage in
peaceful arbitration with Spain resulted in Spanish support
for Moroccan causes such as during the Algerian border war
of 1963. Spain has also assisted Morocco in joint ventures
and the signing of several treaties of cooperation. However,
by 1966, Morocco was becoming impatient with Spanish progress
on the Sahara issue and Moroccan policy became more aggressive
accusing Spain of having no desire to leave the occupied
territory. It appears that the change in Moroccan tactics
resulted from Istiqlal pressures on the King. The Istiqlal
continued to remind the King of his duties to protect the
91

true religion and to defend the "real" borders of
97Morocco.
It was not until 1975 that Spain in addressing the
United Nations stated that they would be leaving the dis-
98puted territory. However, during the same year the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled against Moroccan
claims and the United Nations called for Self Determination
of the area. This decision prompted King Hassan's "green
march" which would be a peaceful occupation of the area by
99
several hundreds of thousands of Moroccan citizens. Talks
were in progress between Morocco and Spain during the pre-
paration for the march and it appears that agreement had been
reached. Morocco still held a token march and then without
military involvement had persuaded Spain to hand over the
territory. Spain on the other hand had held the line on
the Saharan borders, preserving the dinity of its military,
while withdrawing with economic concessions. Tripartite
talks followed between Morocco, Mauritania and Spain in
which Spain agreed to leave the area by the end of Februrary
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1976 and the area would be divided between Morocco and
Mauritania.
A visit by the Spanish Foreign Minister to Rabat in
May 1976 illustrated that the Sahara issue was resolved
along with any misunderstandings. The two countries agreed
to seek for more technological and economic cooperation
102between them. Relations between the two continue to
improve as indicated earlier this year by a forty for
million dollar credit from Spain as part of a joint
», . . . 103fishing agreement
.
Relations with France
Immediately following Moroccan independence, relations
between France and Morocco were extremely cordial. The
Franco-Moroccan Agreement was signed in March 1956 and
recognized Morocco's right to conduct her own diplomacy and
to maintain her territorial integrity. In May the two
nations agreed to consult each other on common foreign
policy issues, Morocco agreed to assume all debts which had
been accrued during the protectorate and France agreed to
104
support Morocco's entry into the United Nations. French
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aid to Morocco during 1956 amounted to twenty six billion
105francs with thirty two billion francs promised for 1957-
However, two issues of great concern to Morocco could not
get resolved. Prance would not give a definite schedule
for removal of their troops nor would they address Morocco's
undefined border area with Algeria. The Algerian civil war
had developed rapidly and France wanted to maintain as many
troops on Moroccan soil as possible to protect French citi-
zens and to be available for use in Algeria. In 1958 France
had almost sixty thousand soldiers in Morocco. In 1958
and General de Faulle in power, the Fifth Republic adopted
a much more liberal policy towards its colonies and former
colonies. In I960 the two nations agree to a phase out of
French troops by 1961 and to evacuate the air bases by 1964.
Relations continued to improve with increased technical and
1 (17
cultural assistance. ' France also continued to be the
primary supplier of arms to Morocco during this time frame.
Relations continued to improve until the Ben Barka kidnapping
109in November 1965 • Ben Barka had been living in exile
105Facts on File
,
v. 17, March 21-27, 1957, p. 100A1
106 Facts on File , v. 18, March 20-26, 1958, p. 95A2.
107 de Carmoy, G., Foreign Policy of France , University
of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 231.
SIPRI, The Arms Trade with the Third World , Humanities
Press, 1971, p. 853-854.
1Q9 The New York Times, November 2, 1965, p. 13:1.
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since he had been accused of participating in the 1963
UNFP conspiracy. The mystery has never totally been solved
although there were French secret police and Moroccan
government officials involved. Relations strained as
ambassadors were recalled and all French aid to Morocco
was stopped. It was almost two years until aid was
resumed reaching a total of 323 million frances in 1970.
During the last five years the United States had replaced
France as Morocco's primary aid supplier. However, ties
between the two are still improving with France now replacing
the United States as the primary arms supplier. French
aid and technical assistance continue to increase and it
appears that all barrier to continued good relations have
been removed.
p. 206.
The New York Times
,
February 3, 1970, p. 3:1.
Hyrop, R.F. and others, Area Handbook for Morocco,
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VII. THE UNITED STATES AND MOROCCO
The United States has always considered Morocco as
being in an extremely strategic location. Its Atlantic
coast is adjacent to the European all sea route to central
and South Africa, to India, Australia and the Far East.
The northern coast of Morocco guarded the entrance to the
Mediterranean. As both an Atlantic and Mediterranean power
occupying one side of the Strait of Gibralter, Morocco's
strategic situation merits the consideration of strategic
planners. Morocco's western orientation and its location
adjacent to Europe led to the United States - French
agreement in 1950 to establish four U.S. air bases in
Morocco. These bases were evacuated in 196 3 and will be
discussed later. Although strategic thought has undergone
significant change since the days of the Cold War, Morocco's
importance and strategic position continue to play a vital
role in superpower efforts to improve relations. At the
present time, Morocco's position as the gate to the Atlantic
from the Mediterranean could continue to be important as a
strategic choke point for oil tankers transiting the Med-
iterranean. This could be significant when viewing the





The years immediately following Moroccan independence
from Prance found increasing United States interest in
North Africa. The United States since 195^ had adopted
the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" in which the United
States placed its military dependency primarily on a great
capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and places of
our own choosing, thereby gaining more basic security at
less cost.
The importance of the four Strategic Air Command (SAC)
bases in Morocco played a critical role in the operational
plan of this doctrine. The importance the United States
placed on these bases is illustrated in the grants and loans
supplied to Morocco by the United States. A look at the
Table following illustrates the amount of United States aid
to Morocco increasing as Moroccans increasingly talked of
base closures. As soon as Morocco achieved their independence
one of the primary goals of the new nation was to remove
all foreign powers from its soil. It was in 1959 that agree-
ment was finally reached between the two nations to phase
out the bases by the end of 1963 . It was during the following
year that for the first time since independence, Morocco
opened its doors to the communist countries. Crown Prince
Hassan reached an agreement with the Soviets in which the





AID AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES
(millions of dollars)
Net Obligations and
U.S. Fiscal Yr Loan Authorizations Total Expenditures
Total Loans Grants
1956
1957 20.1 20 0.1
1958 30.5 29.9 0.6 18.9
1959 45.3 ^0.0 5.3 25.3
1960 74.6 63-0 11.6 70.7
1961 38.5 40.0 -1.5 25.7
1962 30.7 30.0 0.8 38.7
1963 20.2 20.0 0.2 27.5
Source: U.S. Economic Assistance Programs. Agency for
International Development and Predecessor
Agencies, April 3, 1948 - June 30, 1963, p. 57
Soviet Union would furnish a gift of fighter aircraft and
a promise of assistance in all other spheres. Military
observers in the United States feared that this turn to the
Soviet Union would seriously compromise the security of the
bases well before the 1963 agreed upon date. The United
States at this time was viewing Moroccan diplomacy as
totally unpredictable and concern was even expressed that
the United States might be prevented free access through
the Strait of Gibralter. This concern over Morocco's turn
to the left resulted in another increase in aid to a total
of 74.6 million dollars during I960. This was the peak year
of United States aid to Morocco during this period. However,
in spite of United States efforts, Morocco accepted the
Soviet aid offer. Viewed from the United States perspective,
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this was definitely a threat which could cool the previous
113friendly relations between the two nations. During
this same time frame, Morocco and the Soviet Union were
having numerous diplomatic and cultural contacts as rela-
tions between the appeared extremely friendly. The trend
towards the Soviets even appeared to manifest itself in
the United Nations. An article in The New York Times
stated, "An informal survey of the recent Moroccan voting
record in the United Nations shows that Morocco, in following
a neutralist path, has voted with the Soviet Union in almost
114
every instance." The view expressed in this article was
fairly prevalent and based on Moroccan voting in the United
Nations it was feared they were moving to the Soviet camp.
The United States informed the Moroccan government of the
115possibility of curtailment of United States arms and aid.
What happened between the two nations to cause such an
apparent shift in relations? For a better understanding,
we must go back to independence and view the results not
from a rational actor model but rather by attempting to
look at all the actors involved and their actions and the
resultant course of events. We will see why the United
^"Morocco Accepts Soviet Aid Offer," The New York
Times , February 12, 1961.
m ibid.
115
"U.S. Cautions Morocco on Arms Aid From Russia,"
The New York Times, February 13, 1961.
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States as the principal supplier of economic and military
aid to Morocco could not exert sufficient influence in
Morocco to cause them to act in the interests of the
United States.
United States Base Rights
The United States had utilized the bases in Morocco
since the early 1950 T s while Morocco was a protectorate.
As a protectorate of France and France a NATO ally, the
United States did not have direct political contact with
Morocco. During the initial base talks between France and
the United States there were no Moroccan's present. There-
fore, at independence, the United States found itself in
the embarrassing position of occupying strategic bases on
Moroccan soil without the consent of the Moroccan government.
One of the basic aims of the Moroccan drive for independence
was the removal of foreign troops. Therefore, one of the
first items was the question of United Sqates bases and
personnel. Although pressure from leftist Moroccan parties
pushed for United States evacuation and kept the issue alive,
talks between the two countries were conducted cordially and
in 1959 during President Eisenhower's visit to Morocco the
decision was made to phase out the bases. It was planned
that by 196 3 the mission of the bases would be assumed by
the growing missile force. Although the United States was
fearful of Moroccan pressure for an accelerated withdrawal,
the Moroccan government did not show any signs of desiring
10Q

a speed up of the original agreement . Therefore the
question of evacuation of the bases should not be viewed
as part of the apparent shift toward the Soviet camp but
rather as part of the drive for Moroccan independence and
a desire to follow a non aligned role.
Diplomatic Contacts
This aspect of Moroccan foreign policy can be examined
from several approaches. During the cold war and throughout
the mid fifties, the Soviets as well as the United States
lived in a bi-polar world. The Soviets while building up
their military capability towards parity with the west did
not venture beyond the communist bloc of nations in foreign
policy. During this period they did not recognize the
existence of non aligned nations. From the Soviet perspec-
tive a nation had to declare itself into one camp or the
other. It was not until Krushchev's policies opened the
Soviet foreign policy towards these nations that the Soviet
Union ventured out to win influence. And it was not until
1956 that the Soviets supplied arms to Egypt and Syria in
their first attempt to reduce western influence. From this
standpoint it does not appear illogical that diplomatic
contacts and aid agreements between the Soviet Union and
Morocco did not exist due mainly to reluctance of the




A look at domestic factors in Morocco can also explain
some of the overtures Morocco made to the east. The new
Moroccan government was faced with mounting domestic
problems including lack of capital, direction and a
growing demand for more democratic process. These problems
manifested themselves in a critical press, political rallies,
riots and serious political attacks and opposition from
leftist political parties. Leftists were accusing the
monarchy of accepting western arms and aid and allowing
western influence ot infiltrate the Royal Armed Forces.
In an effort to diffuse both political and domestic unrest
the king began to increase his ties with the Soviet Union.
This policy was politically palatable for all factions
since Morocco had advertised their policy of non alignment
since independence.
Mauritania
The issue of Mauritania played a major role in deter-
mining the course of Moroccan events. As previously mentioned
Moroccan territorial claims include portions of Mauritania.
The issue of Mauritanian independence was scheduled to go
before the United Nations General Assembly during the I960
session. Prance was expected to sponsor Mauritania for
membership in the United Nations and this proposal was to
be backed by the United States. The Soviet Union on the
other hand backed Moroccan claims in the United Nations.
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The United States attempted to counter Soviet influence
through an increased aid program for the 1960-1964 period.
However, the Soviet veto on the Mauritania issue was seen
as a more valuable prize than offers of aid. It could be
assumed that the Soviet offer of the veto could be tied to
the introduction of arms to the area.
United Nations Voting (See following chart.)
It was the opinion of many in the United States that
the shift of Morocco to the east was reflected in their
United Nations voting record. During this time frame
there were numerous issues in the United Nations dealing
with the emergence of the Third World, the Middle East and
issues concerning colonies or former colonies of United
States allies. It should be expected that Morocco would
support other nations striving for independence as they
themselves had done.
The Soviet Union also saw it in their interests to
encourage and vote in behalf of these newly emerging nations
and against the western colonial powers. The United States,
on the other side was intrinsically tied to Great Britain,
Prance and Portugal and this is reflected in the United States
voting record. The record also shows that Morocco was not
that closely tied to the Soviet Union on other critical
issues. Morocco on numerous occasions either absented or
abstained on United States backed resolutions while other
arab states as Algeria and the United Arab Republic were
in direct accord with the Soviet voting record.
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UNITED NATIONS VOTING CHART
MOROCCO / UNITED STATES /USSR
1958 I960 1962 1963 1965
Number M U S M U S M U S M U S M U S
of S S S S S
Resolutions R A V R A V R A V R A V R A V
1 Y A Y Y A Y A Y N A Y N Y A Y
2 A Y N Y A Y Y Y A Y A Y Y Y A
3 A Y N Y A Y Y N Y Y A N Y Y A
4 N Y N Y A Y A Y N Y A N Y A Y
5 A Y N Y Y A A Y A Y Y A Y N Y
6 A Y N N Y N Y N Y Y Y A Y N Y
7 Y A Y A Y N Y A Y Y A Y Y N Y
8 Y Y N Y A Y Y A Y Y A Y A Y N
9 Y N Y N Y N Y Y A Y A Y N Y N
10 Y Y N N Y N A Y N Y A Y A N A
11 Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y
12 Y N Y Y A Y Y N Y Y A Y
13 Y N Y Y N Y Y A Y Y A Y
14 Y A Y Y A Y Y N Y
15 Y A Y Y A Y Y N Y
16 Y A Y Y Y N Y A Y
17 Y Y A Y Y N Y A Y
18 Y Y A Y Y N Y Y A
19 Y Y N Y A Y
20 A Y N Y N Y
21 Y A N
Y - Yes vote N - No vote A - Abstained
Information extracted from U.N. Yearbooks 1958 through 1973
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UNITED NATIONS VOTING CHART
MOROCCO / UNITED STATES / USSR
1966 1967 1969 1970 1973
Number M U S M U S M U S M U S M U S
of s S S s s
Resolutions R A V R A V R A V R A V R A V
1 A N Y Y Y A Y Y A Y A Y A Y N
2 Y A Y Y A Y Y N Y Y Y A Y Y A
3 Y A Y Y A Y Y Y N Y Y A A A Y
4 N Y N Y A Y Y Y A Y Y A Y N Y
5 A Y N Y N Y A Y A Y A Y Y N Y
6 Y N A Y Y A Y N Y Y A Y Y A Y
7 Y A Y Y Y A N Y N Y N Y Y A Y
8 Y A Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y Y A Y
9 Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y N Y A Y
10 Y N Y Y A Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y
11 Y A Y Y A V Y N A Y N Y Y N Y
12 Y A Y Y A Y Y N A Y N Y Y N Y
13 Y N Y Y N Y Y A Y Y N Y Y N Y
14 Y A Y Y A Y Y N A Y N Y Y N Y
15 Y A Y Y A Y Y A Y Y Y N Y A Y
16 Y Y A Y A Y Y A Y Y Y A Y N Y
17 Y A Y Y N Y Y A Y N Y N Y A Y
18 Y A Y Y A Y Y A Y Y N Y Y Y A
19 Y N Y Y A Y Y Y N Y N Y Y N Y
20 Y N Y Y A Y Y M Y
21 Y A Y A Y N Y Y A
22 Y Y A Y A Y
23 Y A Y Y A Y
24 Y N Y Y N Y
25 Y N Y Y A Y
26 Y N Y Y A Y
27 Y A Y Y N Y
28 Y N Y. Y N Y
29 Y N Y Y A Y
30 Y Y A Y A Y
31 Y A Y Y N Y
32 Y Y A Y A Y
33 Y A Y
34 Y N Y
35 Y N Y
Y - Yes vote N - No vote A - Abstained




This period begins with Crown Prince Hassan assuming
the throne vacated by Mohammed V. The young monarch helped
by his former record of government experience was handi-
capped by a reputation of personal indiscretion. The new
king immediately announced his political intentions, stating
that economic improvement must come first followed by a
democratic form of government. In the United States we
also witness a change of leadership as John Kennedy enters
the presidency. This administration adopts the doctrine
of Flexible Response in which the United States would have
the capability for all modern types of warfare but would
still place their main reliance on nuclear weaponry. In
the presidents message to congress he also states that our
military assistance programs are a necessary part of this
concept. In the underdeveloped nations of Africa, he viewed
economic programs as essential in improving conditions to
preclude external covert intrusion. In the Soviet Union
the conflict with China and the failure to obtain a solution
to the Germany question created a dnagerous confrontation
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet
foreign policy began to get more daring as Krushchev began
to take dangerous gambles. The Soviet Union during this
period took an active interest in Africa where their primary
1 -I c






objective was to create a deepening estrangement of
African politicians and intelligentsia from the West.
They desired to keep Africa a source of division conflict
117
and danger to the West.
Algerian Conflict
Initially when Hassan assumed the throne the Soviet Union
which was supporting the Algerian nationalists wanted to
ship arms to Algeria through Morocco. Hassan refused
although he supported the revolution, due to fears of
internationalizing the war. The king eventually relented
and sizeable arms shipments were reported funnelled through
11 8
Morocco to Algeria. The Moroccan support of the Algerian
war led to continued friction between Morocco and Prance and
France's ally the United States. This was in spite of the
fact that over ninety percent of Moroccan trade was with
the West. As the United States was preparing to leave
Morocco, the Soviet Union was making effective efforts to
move in. There were Soviet requests for bases and ports
which would have given them a strong position in the Medi-
terranean. 3y 1962, Soviet activity was evident in the
growing stockpile of Soviet made arms in Morocco. At first
the Soviet sale of arms was discreet but in 1962 there was
117 Ulam, A.B., Expansion and Coexistence
118
The New York Times, February 19, 1961
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a clear threat to the United States as the Soviets were
trying to obtain bases. According to a magazine report,
the Soviets were negotiating with Morocco to build a sub-
marine base on the coast just twenty miles from Gibralter
and a shipyard capable of building ships of up to 10,000
119
tons. As Algerian independence was achieved in 1962,
the newly independent nation turned its attention to the
disputed territories between Algeria and Morocco. With
Algeria appearing firmly entrenched in the Soviet camp and
receiving arms which could be used against Morocco, relations
cooled between Morocco and the Soviet Union. Although not
wanting to break relations entirely, Morocco did protest by
breaking relations with Cuba who Morocco accused of aiding
the Alerians. The Algerian conflict coupled with the fact
that the Soviet Union no longer protested the entry of
Mauritania into the United Nations considerably weakened
Soviet-Moroccan relations. It was during this time frame
that Morocco opened its doors to Communist China. Morocco
initiated diplomatic relations and a small "scale trade
relationship was formed. This was viewed as a slap at the
Soviets since the Sino-Soviet split was at its peak. An
earlier ordered shipment of Soviet arms arrived in 1962 and
with the exception of small order replacement parts there
were no further Soviet arms shipments until 1967- In 1967
119U.S. Mews and World Report
,
v. LIII, no. 12,
September 17, 1962, p. 43.
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a shipment of Soviet made T-54 tanks were shipped to Morocco
* n v, n i 4 12from Czechoslovakia.
United States Support
United States relations with Morocco improved during the
Algerian war of 1963- United States aid in the form of
advisory, technical and logistical assistance considerably
helped United States popularity. In addition, United States
economic assistance to Morocco had reached 400 million by
1964, 500 million by 1966 and 600 million by 1967. 121 The
United States had also become Morocco's second largest
supplier. With the Algerian war over, Morocco desired to
return to a policy of non alignment, however, the arrival
of large quantities of modern Soviet equipment in Algeria
during 1965 forced Morocco to turn again to the West.
Western diplomats generally discounted the idea that the
Algerians would initiate an attack, however, they showed
understanding of the Moroccan view that a dangerous military
imbalance existed. The United States through FMS sales sold
four F-5B's and four helicopters to Morocco in addition to
a 32 million MAP which included twelve F-5A, C-119 ' s and
C-47's along with some armored cars. The previous year, the
United States gave Morocco thirty five suplust 90mm self-
122propelled anti-tank guns
.
120 Area Handbook for Morocco.
121
Astrachan, A., "Aid Reslices The Pie," African Report
June 1967, p. 8-15.




A look at United States trade statistics with Morocco
(see following table) illustrates that although the volume
of trade is not enormous it reveals no appreciable gains or
losses during this time frame which could indicate a trend
in relations. United States imports from Morocco and
exports to Morocco increased fairly steadily throughout the
period. However, a look at the same chart illustrates that
the Soviet trade statistics reflect a similar trend.
Loans and Credits
A look at the following chart and the long term loans
and credits reflect United States-Moroccan relations. In
FY 1959 the long term loans and credits amounted to over
100 million which one could possibly tie to the desire in
retaining the air bases. Once the agreement was reached
there is a drastic cut to 60 million for FY i960. With
Soviet interest appearing in Morocco we see a gradual climb
to 70 million in FY 1961 and 1962. In FY 1964 and the
Soviets firmly embedded in Algeria, Soviet relations with
Morocco poor and the Algerian border war we see another
cutback to approximately 12 million. After termination of
the war and renewed Soviet interest in Morocco, United
States loans and credits again climb. The end of this
period brings another United States reduction to 33 million




































Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics
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Source: Foreign Credits, United States
Government Printing Office,
December 31, 1971, December 31,




Throughout the entire period, Algeria imported in
excess of 259 million dollars worth of arms almost exclu-
sively from the Soviet Union. During this same time frame,
Morocco imported a total of 104 million dollars in arms
of whici the United States supplied less than half. In
addition, the Soviets also furnished sizeable amounts to
Morocco. The United States was reluctant to match the Soviet
buildup in Algeria in fear of starting an arms race in
North Africa. 123
United Nations Voting
A look at the United Nations voting record for Morocco
during this period could possibly lead one to the conclusion
that the Soviet Union was able to gain a significant amount
of influence (see chart on p. 112). During the period
1961-1968 ninety one resolutions were examined. Of these,
there were only thirty five in which the United States and
the Soviets took opposing views. Of the thirty five resolu-
tions Morocco voted with the United States on four issues,
with the Soviet Union on twenty three issues and abstained
on eight issues. However, we must again examine the issues
and in doing so we see that the issues involve colonies,
former colonies, Middle East or African affairs. It must
1 2^U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, The
International Transfer of Conventional Arms
,
U.S. Government
Printing Office, April 12, 1974.
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be assumed that an independent nation and a former colony
that has arab and african affairs interwoven into their
foreign affairs would naturally vote the way they did.
Due to the issues concerned we cannot deduce any Soviet or
United States influence gained and what we do see is a
nation interested in its regional area.
Basing Rights
Perhaps a better view of influence could be obtained by
a look at basing rights and foreign military personnel
stationed in Morocco. Although the United States negotiated
for the evacuation of their air bases, the Moroccan govern-
ment allowed the United States to retain a vital communica-
tions center at Kenitra which is manned by United States
personnel. On the other hand, except for a small contingent
of Soviet technicians which arrived to assemble and assist
with the first delivery of weapons there are no Soviet bloc
military personnel stationed in Morocco.
PERIOD 1968-1976
This period of United States-Moroccan relations is
highlighted by the Nixon Doctrine in which we look to each
nation to define the nature of their own security and
determine the parth of their own progress. The United
States will provide elements of military strength and
economic resources appropriate to our interests. The
defense and progress of some other countries must be their




and not primarily America's concern. The new Nixon
doctrine implies that we will increase our military and
economic assistance to our friends and allies but avoid
direct United States military intervention.
Situation in Morocco
This last period opens with Morocco improving relations
with the Soviet Union. Towards the latter part of 1967
and into 1968, Morocco accepted delivery of eighty Soviet
made Czechoslovakian T-54 tanks. This was a barter deal
and Morocco supplied primary products in return. The situa-
tion in Algeria had not changed significantly and the Soviets
were still supplying extensive arms into the area. In 1967
the United States agreed to provide approximately fifteen
million dollars worth of ground equipment including armor
and anti-tank material to stiffen her defenses. The United
States promised continued support of "modest" arms aid for
125defensive purposes. During the first several years of
this period, United States interests were focused on Viet
Nam and the situation in the Middle East with little
attention placed on North Africa. The only major United
States arms transfer to Morocco during these early years
was the transfer of five P-5's in 1969. The situation in
12 Department of State Bulletin , v. LXIV, no. 1656,
March 22, 1971.
125
"Rusk and Hassan Agree on Increase in Aid for Morocco,"
The New York Times, February 11, 1967.
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Algeria had not improved significantly and the disparity
between the two countries was still enormous. The following
table illustrates the arms imports of the two nations from
1961 through 1971.
TABLE
VALUE OF ARMS IMPORTS
(millions of U.S. $)
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
MOR 4 11 16 9 7 16 25 15 6 10 5
ALG 3 5 14 64 31 86 41 15 3 24 25
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
The International Transfer of Conventional
Arms , U.S. Government Printing Office,
April 12, 1974
In order to obtain its arms requirements, Morocco began
to look for new suppliers. France had not supplied any
economic or military aid to Morocco since 1966 and the
Ben Barka affair but in the early part of 1970 relations
improved and France once again was supplying aid to Morocco.
Soviet Activity
The Soviets were extremely active during the early
years of this period. In 1967 they agreed to construction
of a twenty million hydro-electric power station and in the
early part of 1968 Morocco purchased 95 armored personnel
carriers from Czechoslovakia. In 1969 President Podgorny
arrived for a six day visit in which talsk focused on economic
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and military aid. In October 1971 Soviet Premier Kosygin
scheduled a visit to Morocco for the prime purpose of dis-
cussing economic aid. Since the early part of this period
there have been numerous instances of Soviet aid and




It was about 1970 when United States interest returned
to Morocco and Secretary of State Rogers arrived for talks
and President Nixon also planned a follow-on trip in July
1970. It was also in 1970 that the secret base agreement
which allowed the United States to stay at Kenitra was
exposed. There were fears that the United States would
have to leave but the Moroccan government played the issue
down and the United States remained. The renewed interest
by the United States was reflected in a speech by the
Assistant Secretary of State.
"Despite the withdrawal of military
facilities from Morocco, our economic
and strategic interests there remain
substantial. We have growing tade and
investment in that country. We value
the presence of this friend at the
southern side of the gateway to the
Mediterranean. "127
26,
'Senate Finds U.S. Secret Base in Morocco for Navy
Communication," The New York Times , July 28, 1970.
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The next significant agreement between Morocco and
the United States was in 1975 for the sale of aircraft,
armored personnel carriers, recovery vehicles, howitzers
and trucks. The agreements were well in excess of 100
million dollars. In the early part of 1976 the United
States reached an agreement with Morocco to sell 24 F-5
aircraft and equipment for a total value of 120 million.
The war in Spanish Sahara caused some concern as to whether
the United States should go through with the deal. In the
meantime Morocco negotiated with France for 300 million
dollar oder for 25 Mirage F-l aircraft. The loss of this
sale will undoubtedly have some effect on American influence
in Morocco.
Trends
During this period, Morocco received increasing amounts
of aid from the richer arab countries. This was probably
in appreciation for their part in the 1973 war. There is
every indication that this aid will continue especially
from Saudi Arabia as Morocco acts as a stabilizing force
in the region. Iran is also willing to supply arms and
equipment to Morocco and the United States has approved
the transfer of United States equipment from Iran to
Morocco. Moroccan ties with France also are greatly improving
During the last three years Morocco has increased their
orders to France to include numerous ships, helicopters,
missiles, artillery and this latest order of the Mirage
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aircraft. It appears that if these trends continue,





What we are witnessing in Morocco is the political
development of a nation relatively new to the field of
effective modern 'administration. In the historical chapter
we saw that Morocco's history has a noticeable void when
discussing effective central government. Their entire
history is a series of conquests with different empires
ruling parts of the nation. Even during the peaceful years
we see the nation divided against itself into the Arab
versus Berber and Siba versus Makhzen factions which would
not permit the Makhzen ruler to form an adequate government
.
The only area under effective rule was the area that the
ruler could control at any given time based on his military
strength. This lack of effective government experience
marks Morocco as noticeably different than most of the
other Arab states. The majority of those states had either
the advantage of being ruled by the excellent Ottoman admin-
istration system or by a relatively long period of exposure
to Western or European administrations. Morocco's geograph-
ical characteristics kept them relatively isolated until
the establishment of the French Protectorate in 1912. However,
it was not until 193^ that the French were able to achieve
pacification throughout the entire nation. It was during
the next twenty two years that Morocco was finally governed
by a fairly effective government. Even during this period
the Moroccans did not determine their nations destiny, since
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it was the French who governed even at the lowest govern-
mental level through the fascade of an appointed Moroccan
counterpart. True Moroccan administration did not occur
until independence was finally achieved. Therefore when
we are discussing Morocco we must realize that for practical
purposes we are speaking of a self governing nation that is
barely twenty two years old. With this in mind one can
understand that the effects of traditionalism may still
play a predominant role in modern Morocco.
Traditional Morocco consisted of an enormous field of
political unions constantly forming, dissolving and realigning
alliances to maintain a working system of segmental opposi-
tion. This history of segmental opposition can be seen
today in the political arena. There has normally been a
balance of different political factions which had been
successfully manipulated by the monarchy. The politicians
of one political faction will very rarely focus on issues
which could seriously jeapordize the existance of the other
faction. The society has operated throughout its history
in a balanced state and this primordial custom cannot be
immediately threatened. This feature of Moroccan society
lends itself well to the multi-party state and a represen-
tational form of government. Neither the society nor the
monarchy inhibit the creation of new political parties.
The creation of these parties has a major impact on the
modernization process and the break up of primordial
differences between the two major segments of society.
Through the political socialization process, the induction
121

into political culture is accomplished at various degrees
from the politician to his most traditional constituent.
This constant association through the political forum has
a way of mellowing basic differences and a shift from one
set of attachments to another. It is curious, in the
opinion of this author, to see the traditional Moroccan
practice of segmental opposition have a direct positive
bearing on the political modernization process.
It was illustrated in the body of this report that the
Islamic religion has many features which appear to have
detrimental effects on modernization. The Islamic teachings
on predestination, free will, community of believers,
relationship between church and state normally oppose both
nationalism and modernization. This holds true in Morocco
also, however, once again we find Morocco unique and it is
this same Islamic religion providing the major strength
in the bond uniting the nation. With the exception of race
it is the only common primordial attachment between Arab
and Berber. In Morocco we witnessed the coastal areas and
the Makhzen receiving the earliest exposure to outside
influences and the first to see an effective governmental
administration. It was also the Makhzen where we see the
first stirrings of nationalism. As this area begins to
shift its allegiance towards nationalism and modernization
we find the politically inferior rural areas remaining
steadfast to the tenets of Islam. Under most similar condi-
tions we would probably find civil strife with both factions
122

seeking autonomy. In Morocco, however, we see th^_king_ as
head of both religion and state, obtaining allegiance from
both factions of society. It was during the critical years
during the drive to independence and the years immediately
following that the monarchy held the nation together.
Even today as the rural areas experience a political awakening
with active participation in the political proces we see
Islam providing the stabilizing force which allows the
peaceful transition. The result will be the lessening
impact of Islam since involvement in the political process
will result in establishing different principles alongside
Islam with the result being a conflict of duties unless
there is a separation of church and state. This separation
can either be within the individual or national policy but
the result is the same.
The effect of the French on modernization in Morocco
must be mentioned. The greatest impact had to have been
due to the pacification of Morocco. This one act completed
in 193^ would totally change Moroccan society. For the
first time in history the area was united under one central
administration. The age-old Makhzen/Siba relationships
had finally been ruptured and the dreams of the nationalists
finally became realistic goals. They could now look at
Morocco as a unified state. The French established the
foundations for an expanding economy in agriculture, mining,
industry and trade. To accompany their economic interests,
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the French established a modern transportation network and
a modern administration to operate the government . Although
the Moroccans were not suitably trained by the French in
effective government operation it did provide the basic
structure which was utilized when the French departed. The
transportation and communication network established by
the French was invaluable in the spread of nationalist
goals throughout the country. This nationalism was a result
of the protectorate and the Moroccans rejection of the
inferior social and psychological status afforded them by
the French and the attempt by the French to encourage
Berber separatism. This is in addition to the physical
disparity in life style between Moroccan and Frenchman which
was so visible in every Moroccan city. The French and their
civilizing mission to Morocco encouraged the creation of
an elite class through their education system. These new
elites had their expectations raised of being assimilated
into French culture and their non acceptance drove them
to seek equality with the French through independence.
These French educated Moroccans provided the initial polit-
ical elites in the country and the founders and organizers
of Moroccan political parties.
The growth of political parties in Morocco enabled
political involvement and expression at all levels of
society. As previously mentioned, the political party and
the party politican play the most important roles in the
modernization process. In Morocco the political party grew
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from a social group voicing protests to the French to
today's party which is a means of voicing interest articu-
lation to the monarchy. Although the country to date has
been ruled as an absolute monarchy, the political parties
and labor unions have been too pwerful for the king not to
be affected by their actions. We witnessed how the king has
maneuvered the political scene through successfully plyaing
each of the parties or coalition of parties against the
other. This type of political activity has caused Morocco
to advance rather slowly towards political modernization.
In Morocco's case, this author feels that the slowness of
progress has been beneficial to Morocco and has allowed a
political awakening throughout the community. One major
problem with most modernizing autocracies is that the
change to a representational type of government is too
abrupt a change from transitional to modern. The majority
of the population cannot accept the loss of the traditional
symbol of authority and the new representative government
is immediately faced with a serious legitimacy crisis.
The rate of Morocco's progress coupled with the various
attempts at constitutional reform and the increase in party
participation is easing the transition towards a representa-
tional government. The major parties in Morocco today
include: (1) The Istiqlal which is the largest and receives
its majority of support from the urban areas, (2) the UNFP
is the main opposition party and receives the majority of
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its support from the Moroccan labor unions, (3) The USFP
is a radical offshoot of the UNFP and most of its support
is from urban intellectuals, (4) The PM is mostly a rural
party deriving support from Berber voters, (5) The PPS
is the small Moroccan communist party, and (6) A number
of smaller parties and independent candidates. It is
evident that the multi-party system is working in Morocco
as the parties represent a complete cross section of Moroccan
society with independents filling in the gaps. There is
also excellent popular support for the political process
as was illustrated by the last election. In the June 1977
legislative elections there was a voter turnout in excess
of eighty two percent of the six and a half million regis-
tered voters. It also appears thatthe present parties have
overcome the poor preparation that was evident at independence
and they have finally stratified into their separate politi-
cal ideologies which should minimize future party splits
and factions.
With this political awakening, the role of the monarchy
is also changing. We have seen the king, backed by strong
traditional rural support from the predominantly Berber
military, play one political faction against the other with
little movement towards representational government. The
king has been successful to date mainly due to the enforce-
ment of his legitimacy through the impact of Islam and his
descent from the Prophet. This alternate source of legiti-
macy has successfully retained the monarchy in command of
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the Moroccan political scene. However, during Morocco's
political maturing, the people are acquiring a greater
sense of common identity, a spirit of equality, a lessening
of the force of Islam resulting in an overall challenge
to the legitimacy of the monarchy. This is illustrated
in everyday Moroccan life in its political development but
was vividly brought to the attention of the king by the two
coup attempts originating from his traditiinal Berber
military support.
In regard to the relinquishing of pwer and movement
towards representational government there can be two
political reasons for the king's slow transfer of power.
The first being that the king enjoys the role of absolute
monarch and will only relinquish enough of his power to
satisfy mounting unrest while attempting to retain as much
power without inciting a violent reaction from the parties.
The second alternative is that the king, western educated
and western oriented is a true patriot and believes that
a representational form of government is best for Morocco
but realized that as a nation Morocco has not been politically
ready for the great leap from monarchical rule to repre-
sentational rule. Although this author believes the latter
to be correct, it is immaterial since the end results are
the same. In either case there will be a slow transfer of
power resulting in dissent from all factions. The political
parties who are politically mature can be expected to voice
127

displeasure at the slow transition whereas the traditional
sector will feel the change too rapid. The transfer of
legitimacy requires skillful manipulation. It is even
offered that the various crises which have befallen Morocco
were contrived by the monarch. Each of these events such
as the Algerian border war, the Western Sahara issue, the
"Green March" and even the fairly current involvement in
Zaire have all come at periods of relative unrest and have
served to rally the nation behind the monarchy in a show
of national strength and unity. The king is still riding
the crest of the Sahara issue. Presently the king has the
strongest legitimacy support in the most traditional sectors
and the least in the most modern sector. However, as
the traditional sector continues to mature we will see
continued progress towards the constitutional monarchy
as authority based on a representational form of government
is legitimized.
There is no simple formula to convert a traditional
society into a modern state. The process is a long, involved
tortuous path where we witness a basic shift in the
attachments held by the people. This shift involves the
entire spectrum of socialization including home environment,
education, social and worker contacts to political partici-
pation. The longer this transitional period of socialization
is allowed to continue, the greater the chance of successfully
shaping the peoples habits towards government. Therefore
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time continues to be on the side of Morocco's political
modernization.
In Morocco we are witnessing many factors which are
favorably improving its political culture. The economic
foundation laid by the French has been maintained as
Morocco continues to industrialize. There have been several
economic setbacks but in general the movement has been
positive. The impact of the North-South dialogue has more
than tripled the price of phosphate which is Morocco's
main export. The increase in industrialization and tourism
has improved the economic situation of the people and has
resulted in a growing middle class. This in turn involves
a shift in power from the country to the city and power is
successfully widened to include demands for political partici'
pation by urban social groups. This results in a greater
transfer of ideas, more participation in the political
process, greater political recruitment and better interest
articulation. In addition, the government establishes
closer ties with the masses enabling it to become more
adaptive to their demands.
The impact of Islam on the modernizing process is also
undergoing change. As education continues to remain one of
Morocco's top priorities we are seeing traditional Islamic
thoughts replaced by modern political thought. Simultaneous
with this is a corresponding decrease in the Moroccan ulema
class. The benefits derived from a western education have
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deterred the older ulema families from sending their children
to traditional schools which has resulted in a reduction
in the overall level of competence in the ulema class.
This was probably inevitable since the establishment of a
strong central government controlling a unified state does
not present the ideal environment for the strong, traditional
ulema class. The absence of a strong ulema class and a
modern education system have combined to lessen the Islamic
impact on modernization. This is true in the rural areas
also where the strong central state has resulted in a
decrease in the number of brotherhoods.
Morocco is on the verge of becoming a constitutional
monarchy. The political parties have a broad base and we
should witness excellent recruitment patterns. Interest
articulation will continue to improve through Moroccan
labor unions, student organizations, social groups, the
military, political parties and a free press. There is
currently no censorship placed on the news media and
reporting is excellent even to the extent of government
criticism. Universal suffrage is practiced and political
participation is excellent. Primordial differences are
disappearing as Arab and Berber interact in the political
process. Language differences are disappearing as arabic
is the national language taught in all schools. The future
looks bright and it is anticipated that Morocco will achieve
representational government without a violent upheaval as
the transitional period allows a transfer of political
obligations to the new authority.
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Moroccan claims by King Hassan that Morocco's foreign
policy will be one of non alignment appear well founded.
In following this policy, however, it does appear that
Morocco is slightly off center and leaning towards the
West. Whether this is due to the French legacy, the ties
with the West which were not severed at independence, the
influence of Islam in rejecting Communism or the combination
of any of these cannot be determined. Another major factor
is that the primary threat to Morocco has been and continues
to be Algeria. Algeria has almost a sole supplier relation-
ship with the Soviet Union and appears to be firmly estab-
lished in the Soviet camp. It is felt that the Soviets have
a larger stake in Algeria than Morocco and in the event
of another Moroccan-Algerian conflict the Soviets could
affect the outcome through favored arms treatment towards
Algeria.
Since 1956 and independence we have seen the major
attempt to obtain some influence in Moroccan affairs. The
United States attempted with increased aid to retain its
Moroccan air bases. The United States threatened aid cur-
tailment in an attempt to prevent inroads by the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union once established as an arms supplier
to Morocco immediately attempted to obtain base and port
facilities in Morocco. None of these attempts were
successful and Morocco continued on its path of non alignment.
The policy of the United States in its aid to Morocco
represents a hegemonic pattern of supply. United States aid
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is provided to ensure continued good relations with the
government of Morocco in addition to supporting a government
that is anti-communist. Although two cup attempts have
been attempted by factions of the military, the army
continues to be a strong supporter of King Hassan. Con-
tinued aid to enable Morocco to maintain adequate military
strength to meet the threat could ensure continued allegiance
to the king.
A review of the criteria generally established as being
determinants of influence reveals that Morocco is following
their advertised policies.
Diplomatic Contacts - Moroccan contacts with both
eastern and western nations are and have been considerable.
Exchanges are common as King Hassan examines all avenues
for ways to meet his country's needs.
Trade - A review of trade statistics in the chart on
page 112 reveals no abnormal patterns for either the United
States or the Soviet Union. Trade for both nations and
Morocco has grown steadily.
Alliances - Morocco has avoided joining alliances with
any of the major powers. Morocco is an active participator
in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, The
League of Arab States, The Organization of African Unity
and The Islamic Solidarity Bloc. Morocco has maintained
cordial relations with the United States and the Soviet
Union while attempting to remain netural at the regional
level in intra-arab and intra-african rivalries. Morocco
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on numerous occasions has hosted conferences to alleviate
differences between regional states.
United Nations Voting - A review of twenty years of
Moroccan voting in the United Nations reveals no signficant
patterns which would indicate influence for any of the
major suppliers. Although the chart on page 104 indicates
that Morocco voted significantly more times with the Soviet
Union than with the United States it is necessary to examine
the issues and the patterns of superpower voting. Morocco
continues to support Third World countries and this is
reflected in the voting pattern. The Soviet Union in efforts
to win political influence with the Third World and to
undermine western influence has been supporting Third World
aspirations in the United Nations. The United States on
the other hand is tied around the world in various treaties
and alliances and cannot afford to jeapordize these relation-
ships. Therefore, an issue which puts a United States ally
against a colony or former colony of that ally the United
States will normally abstain or votes in favor of the ally.
Base Rights - In this area the United States is viewed
as having an edge. The United States currently maintains
about one thousand military personnel stationed in Morocco
to operate a communication facility, a Moroccan training
detachment, a naval detachment at Kenitra and a MAAG at
Rabat. After the agreement to evacuate the bases was signed
it was agreed by both govenments that the communication
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facilities would remain. The Soviet Union has attempted
to secure base rights but to date has not succeeded.
It can be assumed that excluding a radical change in
the government, Morocco will continue its policy of non
alignment with leanings towards the West. The Soviet Union
and the United States will continue in their attempts to
win influence. It is also quite probable that as long
as the threat remains Algeria and Libya and the Soviet
Union remains their primary supplier that relations between
the Soviet Union and Morocco will not improve substantially.
The curent problems in the newly occupied territories
in Spanish Sahara and the Polisario guerrilla war continue
to plague Morocco. It will be in the United States interests
to support Morocco to counter this threat. Moroccan
interests have always coincided fairly well with United
States interests. This has been vividly illustrated lately
by Morocco's role in Zaire and with their current support
of President Sadat's peace initiatives. The United States
cannot: afford to lose Morocco to the Soviet camp since
with the exception of Tunisia
,
that would place all of
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